# Wiki Doc 4

### 1NC – FW – Info Reflexivity

#### Interpretation – affs must defend hypothetical enactment of a United States federal government policy that substantially increases prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases 64. [Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition]

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or **determination by resolution or vote**; as ‘it was resolved **by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”**.

#### The United States federal government is the national government in DC.

Black’s Law 4. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, June 1, 2004, pg.716]

Federal government. 1. A **national government** that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) **central government**. 2. **the U.S. government** – Also **termed national government**. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]

#### ‘Core antitrust laws’ means Sherman, Clayton, and FTC

Phaffenroth 21 [Sonia Kuester Pfaffenroth, Partner, Arnold and Porter, focuses her practice on helping clients address complex antitrust issues in the US and globally. She rejoined the firm in 2017 from the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) where she served most recently as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil and Criminal Operations. In that role, Ms. Pfaffenroth was responsible for supervising both civil and criminal antitrust enforcement efforts, as well as the Division's work with antitrust and competition law enforcement agencies worldwide. Justin Hedge, Counsel, Arnold and Porter, and Monique N. Boyce, Sr. Associate, Arnold and Porter. “A Comparison Of Proposed Antitrust Legislation In 2021: Federal And New York State.” 7/2/21. https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/antitrust-eu-competition-/1086194/a-comparison-of-proposed-antitrust-legislation-in-2021-federal-and-new-york-state]

At the federal level, there are three core antitrust laws: (1) the Sherman Act, in which Section 1 outlaws "every contract, combination, or conspiracy in [unreasonable] restraint of trade," and Section 2 outlaws any "monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize";1 (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices";2 and (3) Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."3 Criminal violations of the Sherman Act carry a maximum penalty of a $100 million fine for corporations, and a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine for individuals. A prevailing plaintiff in a civil suit can recover treble damages and attorneys' fees. But federal law currently does not provide for civil penalties when the government brings an antitrust case, only injunctive relief.

#### That’s key to predictability -- only an interp grounded in relevant legal literature gives debaters the basis to prepare negatives and affirmatives guaranteed to clash. There are a few impacts –

#### First is competitive equity – without predictable preparation and a stable stasis point, there is an aff side bias that destroys the competitive nature of the activity and participation – equity is obviously an impact because debate is a game that is key to the aff – if not, just vote neg

#### Second is information reflexivity --

#### The process of debate around a predictable governmental plan best creates the conditions for informed learning and well-rounded information gathering through a holistic research approach – the impact is information reflexivity – issues of factual evidence are difficult to resolve and require informed processes and information vetting to counter problematic premises that result in material violence like the Iraq war – only a model of debate that encourages 2nd and 3rd level argument testing, considers unintended consequences, and promotes conditional and dynamic argumentation will foster well informed decisions and self-efficacy

Leek 16. [Danielle R. Leek, Johns Hopkins University Advanced Academic Programs instructor, Director of Academic Innovation and Distance Education at Bunker Hill Community College, former executive director of the communications center and professor of communications at Grand Valley State University, “Policy debate pedagogy: a complementary strategy for civic and political engagement through service-learning,” Communication Education, 65:4, 401-405]

In policy debate, students are asked to consider whether a particular course of action should be taken, generally by state institutions such as the United States federal government, or its respective branches, such as the Supreme Court or the Congress (Snider & Schnurer, 2002). A policy debate can involve any institutional actor or agent such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and so on. Questions of policy can address broad global issues, such as “Should the United States federal government sign a new nuclear treaty with Iran?” Or they might consider narrow rules for legal action, such as“Should the Michigan Department of Treasury require individuals to pay taxes online?” When connected to a service-learning experience, educators might set aside time for students to debate a relevant policy question. Using previous examples, students working on the health campaign might also be asked to debate the question, “Should the City of Grand Rapids provide mobile health clinics in the downtown area?” Chemistry students could debate, “Should the federal government require a universal science curriculum in all high schools?” No matter the topic, students should have the opportunity to engage multiple perspectives on the question, including speaking on the affirmative to support a new policy and on the negative in opposition to a change in the status quo. Students may be asked to work with one or more partners to research and develop materials that can be used in their speeches or in question-and-answer periods related to their arguments.

Especially for readers familiar with extracurricular policy debate competitions in high schools or college, this depiction of what policy debate entails may seem overly simplistic. Yet, even basic consideration of policy issues related to a service-learning experience can improve a student’s odds of political learning. Through policy debate, students can develop information literacy and learn how to make critical arguments of fact. This experience is politically empowering for students who will also build confidence for political engagement.

Information literacy

While there are many definitions of information literacy, the term generally is understood to mean that a student is “able to recognize when information is needed, and have the ability to locate, evaluate, and use effectively the information needed” for problem-solving and decision-making (Spitzer, Eisenberg, & Lowe, 1998, p. 19). Information exists in a variety of forms, in visual data, computer graphics, sound-recordings, film, and photographs. Information is also constructed and disseminated through a wide range of sources and mediums. Therefore, “information literacy” functions as a blanket term which covers a wide range of more specific literacies. Critiques of service-learning’s knowledge-building power, such as those articulated by Eby (1998) and Colby (2008), are challenging both the emphasis the pedagogy places on information gained through experience and the limited scope of political information students are exposed to in the process.

Policy debate can augment a student’s civic and political learning by fostering extended information literacies. Snider and Schnurer (2002) identify policy debate as an especially research intensive form of oral discussion which requires extensive time and commitment to learn the dimensions of a topic. Understanding policy issues calls for contemplating a range of materials, from traditional news media publications to court proceedings, research data, and institutional propaganda. Moreover, the nature of policy debate, which involves public presentation of arguments on two competing sides of a question, motivates students to go beyond basic information to achieve a more advanced level of expertise and credibility on a topic (Dybvig & Iverson, n.d.). This type of work differs from traditional research projects where students gather only the materials needed to support their argument while neglecting contrary evidence. Instead, the “debate research process encourages a kind of holistic approach, where students need to pay attention to the critics of their argument because they will have to respond to those attacks” (Snider & Schnurer, 2002, p. 32). In today’s attention economy, cultivating a sensibility for well-rounded information gathering can also aid students in recognizing when and how the knowledge produced in their social environments can be effectively translated to specific contexts. The “cultural shift in the production of data” which has followed the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies means that all students are likely “prosumers”—that is, they consume, produce, and coproduce information online all at the same time (Scoble, 2011).

Coupling service- learning with policy debate calls on students to apply information across registers of public engagement, including their own service efforts and their own public argumentation, in and outside of their debates. Information is used in the service experience, which in turn, informs the use of information in debates, where students then produce new information through their argumentation. The process is what Bruce (2008) refers to “informed learning,” or “using information in order to learn.” When individuals move from learning how to gather materials for a task to a cognitive awareness and understanding of how the information-seeking process shapes their learning, they are engaged in informed learning. Through this process, students can come to recognize that information management and credibility is deeply disciplinary and historically contextual (Bruce & Hughes, 2010). This understanding, combined with practical experience in locating information, is a critical missing element in contemporary political engagement. Over 20 years ago, Graber (1994) argued that one of the biggest obstacles to political engagement was not apathy, but a gap between the way news media presents information during elections, and the type of information voters need and will listen to during electoral campaigns. The challenge extends beyond elections into policy-making, especially as younger generations continue to revise their notions of citizenship away from institutional politics towards more social forms of activism (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011). For students to effectively practice more expressive forms of citizenship they need experience managing the breadth of information available about issues they care about. As past research indicates a strong correlation between service-learning experience and the motivation and desire for post-graduation service, it seems likely that students who debate about policy issues related to service areas will continue their informed learning practices after they have left the classroom (Soria & Thomas-Card, 2014).

Arguing facts

In addition to building information literacies, students who combine policy debate with service-learning can practice “politically relevant skills,” which will help them have confidence for political engagement in the future. As Colby (2008) explains, this confidence should be tempered by tolerance for difference and differing opinions. On the surface, debating about institutional politics might seem counterintuitive to this goal. Politicians and the press have a credibility problem among college-aged students, and this leaves younger generations less inclined to feel obligated to the state or to look to traditional modes of policymaking for social change (Bennett et al., 2011; Manning & Edwards, 2014). This lack of faith in government and media outlets also makes political argument more difficult (Klumpp, 2006). Whereas these institutions once served as authoritative and trustworthy sources of information, the credibility of legislators and journalists has decreased over the last 40 years or so. Today, politicians and pundits are viewed as political actors interested in spectacle, power, and profit rather than truth-seeking or the common good.

While some political controversies are rooted in competing values, Klumpp (2006) explains that arguments about policy are more often based in fact. Indeed, when engaged in public arguments over questions of policy, people tend to “invoke the authority of facts to support their positions.” Likewise, “the governmental sphere has developed elaborate legal and deliberative processes in recognition of the power of facts as the basis for a decision.” Yet, while shared values are often quickly agreed upon, differences over fact are more difficult to resolve. Without credible institutions of authority that can disseminate facts, public deliberation requires more time, information-gathering, evaluation, and reasoning. The Bush administration’s decision to take military action in Iraq, for example, was presumably based on the “fact” that Saddam Hussein had acquired weapons of mass destruction. This has now become a classic example of poor policy-making grounded in faulty factual evidence.

This shortcoming is precisely why policy debate is a valuable complement to servicelearning activities. Not only can students use their developing literacies to better understand social problems, they can also learn to access a broader range of knowledge sources, thereby mitigating the absence of fact-finding from traditional institutions. Furthermore, policy advocacy gives students experience testing the reasoning underlying claims of fact. Issues of source credibility, analogic comparisons, and data analysis are three examples of the type of critical thinking skills that students may need to apply in order to engage a question of policy (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt, & Louden, 1999). While the effect may be to undermine government action in some instances, in others students will gain a better understanding of when and where institutional activities can work to make change. As students gain knowledge about the relationship between institutional structures and the communities they serve, they grow confidence in their ability to engage in future conversations about policy issues. Zwarensteyn’s (2012) research highlights these sorts of effects in high school students who engage in competitive policy debate. Zwarensteyn theorizes that even minimal increases in technical knowledge about politics can translate to significant increases in a student’s sense of self-efficacy. Many students start off feeling very insecure when it comes to their mastery of institutional politics; policy debate helps overcome that insecurity. Moreover, because training in policy debate encourages students to address issues as arguments rather than partisan positions, it encourages them to engage policy-making without the hostility and incivility that often characterizes today’s political scene. Indeed, it is precisely that perceived hostility and incivility that prompts many young people to avoid politics in the first place.

I do not mean to imply that students who debate about their service-learning experiences will draw homogenous conclusions about policies. Quite the contrary. Students who engage in service-learning still bring their personal visions and history to bear on their debates. As a result, students will often have very different opinions after engaging in a shared debate experience. More importantly, the practice of debating should operate to particularize students’ knowledge of community partners and clients, working against the destructive generalizations and power dynamics that can result when students feel privileged to serve less fortunate “others.” For civic and political engagement through service-learning to be meaningful and productive, it must do more to challenge students’ concepts of the homogenous “we” who helps “them.” Seligman (2013) argues that this civic spirit can be cultivated through the core pedagogical principle of a “shared practice,” which emphasizes the application of knowledge to purpose (p. 60). Policy debate achieves this outcome by calling on students to consider and reconsider their understanding of themselves, institutions, community, and policy every time the question “should” may arise. As Seligman writes:

… the orientation of thought to purpose (having an explanation rest at a place, a purpose) is of extreme importance. We must recognize that the orientation of thought to purpose is to recognize moving from providing a knowledge of, to providing a knowledge for. This means that in the context of encountering difference it is not sufficient to learn about (have an idea of) the other, rather it means to have ideas for certain joint purposes—for a set of “to-does.” A purpose becomes the goal towards which our explanations should be oriented. (p. 61)

Put another way, policy debate challenges students “to maintain a sense of doubt and to carry on a systematic and protracted inquiry” in the process of service-learning itself (Seligman, 2013, p. 60). This is precisely the type of complex, ongoing, reflective inquiry that John Dewey had in mind.

Political engagement through policy debate

This essay began with a discussion of the growing attention to civic engagement programs in higher education. The national trend is to accomplish higher levels of student civic responsibility during and after their time in college through service-learning experiences tied to curricular learning objectives. A challenge for service-learning scholars and teachers is to recognize a distinction between civic activities that are accomplished by helping others and political activities that require engagement with the collective institutional structures and processes that govern social life. Both are necessary for democracy to thrive. Policy debate pedagogy can help service-learning educators accomplish these dual objectives.

To call policy debate a pedagogy rather than just a style of debate is purposeful. A pedagogy is a praxis for cultivating learning in others. The pedagogy of service-learning helps students to know and engage social conditions through physical engagement with their environments and communities. Policy debate pedagogy leads students to know and engage these same social conditions while also challenging them to apply their knowledge for the purpose of political advocacy. These pedagogies are natural compliments for cultivating student learning. Therefore, future studies should explore how well service-learning combined with policy debate can resolve concerns that policy debate alone does not go far enough to invest students with political agency (Mitchell, 1998). The present analysis suggests the potential for such an outcome is likely.

Moreover, research is clear that the civic effects of service-learning as an instructional method are improved simply by increasing the amount of time spent on in-class discussion about the service work students do (Levesque-Bristol, Knapp, & Fisher, 2010). Policy debates related to students’ service can accomplish this goal and more. Policy debates can also facilitate the political learning students need to build their political efficacy and capacity for political engagement. Through informed learning about the political process—especially in the context of service practice—students develop literacies that will extend beyond the classroom. Using this knowledge in reasoned public argument about policy challenges invites students to move beyond cynical disengagement towards a productive recognition of their own potential voice in the political world.

Policy debate pedagogy brings unique elements to the process of political learning. By emphasizing the conditional and dynamic nature of political arguments and processes, debates can work to relieve students of the misconception that there is a single “right answer” for questions about policy-making and politics, especially during election time. The communication perspective on policy debates also highlights students’ collective involvement in the ever-changing field of political terms, symbols, and meanings that constitute interpretations of our social world. In fact, the historical roots of the term “communication” seem to demand that speech and debate educators call for such emphasis on political learning. “To make common,” the Latin interpretation of communicare, situates our discipline as the heart of public political affairs (Peters, 1999). Connecting policy debate to service-learning helps highlight the common purpose of these approaches in efforts to promote civic engagement in higher education.

#### You should also filter their impacts through predictable testability and model comparison -- debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered -- a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption. They also create a moral hazard that leads to affs only about individual self-care so even if you think this aff is answerable, the ones they incentivize are not, so assume the worst possible affirmative when weighing our impacts.

## case

### 1NC - Alt Fails

#### Neolib is resilient – global resistance proves

Igor Guardiancich 17, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Management of the University of Southern Denmark, 3/3/2017, “Absorb, Coopt and Recast: Global Neoliberalism’s Resilience through Local Translation”, http://www.euvisions.eu/neoliberalisms-resilience-translation/

One powerful message permeating the book, and which gives a forceful explanation to Colin Crouch’s punchy title is that: “rather than a mass-produced, slightly shrunk, and off-the-rack ideological suit, neoliberalism is a bespoke outfit made from a dynamic fabric that absorbs local color” (5). Even under a full-out attack against some of its basic assumptions, such as the one unleashed in the immediate wake of the global financial crisis, neoliberalism proved resilient beyond its many architects’ wildest dreams. Its capacity to absorb, coopt and recast selected ideas of oppositional social forces has been the most valuable asset guaranteeing its survival. Again, the comparison of the responses to the crisis in Spain and Romania show such adaptability in full.¶ The socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero tried to salvage the social-democratic legacies of the Spanish economy by engineering a Keynesian rescue package. Only later, when the disaster of the cajas became apparent and the emergency intensified, did conservative PM Mariano Rajoy embrace more deregulation in the labour market (inspired by the Hartz IV reform) and extensive cuts in the public sector under the strong external pressure of the European Central Bank and of international financial markets.¶ In Romania, local policymakers further radicalized in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers’ crisis, thereby outbidding the IMF on austerity and structural reforms. Instead of shielding lower-income groups, the opposite strategy of upward redistribution was chosen. By heroically withstanding the external attempts at moderation, the Romanian economy retained an unenviable mix of libertarian achievements (flat-tax rates), experimental neoliberalism (privatized pensions) and mainstream neoliberal orthodoxy (sound finance, labour market deregulation, social policy targeting, privatization of all public companies). Pure laissez-faire ideas such as the replacement of the welfare state by a voluntary, private, Christian charity system were not unheard of.¶ Hence, through an insightful analysis of the ideational underpinnings of its local interpretations, this book shows us that, despite the challenges, neoliberalism is alive and kicking. Ban guides us through half a century of policymaking in Spain and Romania, and embeds his analysis within the related nuances of contemporary liberal economic thought. The research is a valuable addition to a growing literature on the origin of current ideational frames and comfortably sits alongside contemporary classics, such as Mark Blyth’s Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea.

#### No mindset shift

Heinberg 15—Senior Fellow-in-Residence of the Post Carbon Institute (Richard, “The Anthropocene: It’s Not All About Us”, <http://www.postcarbon.org/the-anthropocene-its-not-all-about-us/>, dml)

It’s hard to convince people to voluntarily reduce consumption and curb reproduction. That’s not because humans are unusually pushy, greedy creatures; all living organisms tend to maximize their population size and rate of collective energy use. Inject a colony of bacteria into a suitable growth medium in a petri dish and watch what happens. Hummingbirds, mice, leopards, oarfish, redwood trees, or giraffes: in each instance the principle remains inviolate—every species maximizes population and energy consumption within nature’s limits. Systems ecologist Howard T. Odum called this rule the Maximum Power Principle: throughout nature, “system designs develop and prevail that maximize power intake, energy transformation, and those uses that reinforce production and efficiency.”

In addition to our innate propensity to maximize population and consumption, we humans also have difficulty making sacrifices in the present in order to reduce future costs. We’re genetically hardwired to respond to immediate threats with fight-or-flight responses, while distant hazards matter much less to us. It’s not that we don’t think about the future at all; rather, we unconsciously apply a discount rate based on the amount of time likely to elapse before a menace has to be faced.

True, there is some variation in future-anticipating behavior among individual humans. A small percentage of the population may change behavior now to reduce risks to forthcoming generations, while the great majority is less likely to do so. If that small percentage could oversee our collective future planning, we might have much less to worry about. But that’s tough to arrange in democracies, where people, politicians, corporations, and even nonprofit organizations get ahead by promising immediate rewards, usually in the form of more economic growth. If none of these can organize a proactive response to long-range threats like climate change, the actions of a few individuals and communities may not be so effective at mitigating the hazard.

This pessimistic expectation is borne out by experience. The general outlines of the 21st century ecological crisis have been apparent since the 1970s. Yet not much has actually been accomplished through efforts to avert that crisis. It is possible to point to hundreds, thousands, perhaps even millions of imaginative, courageous programs to reduce, recycle, and reuse—yet the overall trajectory of industrial civilization remains relatively unchanged.

### 1NC—Infra

#### Infrapolitics are a disaster – they assume a transformative potential from small moments of resistance that simply does not exist.

Reed 16 (Adolph, Jr., Prof. of Political Science @ Penn., “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”” *Nonsite*, http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2)

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8

I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following:

At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9

### 1NC - Cap Good - CCS

#### It’s key to CCS – link-turns every impact.

Graciela ‘16 (/16 – Professor of Economics and of Statistics at Columbia University and Visiting Professor at Stanford University, and was the architect of the Kyoto Protocol carbon market (being interviewed by Marcus Rolle, freelance journalist specializing in environmental issues and global affairs, “Reversing Climate Change: Interview with Graciela Chichilnisky,” http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/01/09/2016/reversing-climate-change-interview-graciela-chichilnisky)//cmr

GC: Green capitalism is a new economic system that values the natural resources on which human survival depends. It fosters a harmonious relationship with our planet, its resources and the many species it harbors. It is a new type of market economics that addresses both equity and efficiency. Using carbon negative technology™ it helps reduce carbon in the atmosphere while fostering economic development in rich and developing nations, for example in the U S., EU, China and India. How does this work? In a nutshell Green Capitalism requires the creation of global limits or property rights nation by nation for the use of the atmosphere, the bodies of water and the planet’s biodiversity, and the creation of new markets to trade these rights from which new economic values and a new concept of economic progress emerges updating GDP as is now generally agreed is needed. Green Capitalism is needed now to help avert climate change and achieve the goals of the 2015 UN Paris Agreement, which are very ambitious and universally supported but have no way to be realized within the Agreement itself. The Carbon Market and its CDM play critical roles in the foundation of Green Capitalism, creating values to redefine GDP. These are needed to remain within the world’s “CO2 budget” and avoid catastrophic climate change. As I see it, the building blocks for Green Capitalism are then as follows; (1) Global limits nation by nation in the use of the planet’s atmosphere, its water bodies and biodiversity - these are global public goods. (2) New global markets to trade these limits, based on equity and efficiency. These markets are relatives of the Carbon Market and the SO2 market. The new market create new measures of economic values and update the concept of GDP. (3) Efficient use of Carbon Negative Technologies to avert catastrophic climate change by providing a smooth transition to clean energy and ensuring economic prosperity in rich and poor nations. These building blocks have immediate practical implications in reversing climate change and can assist the ambitious aims of Paris COP21 become a reality. MR: What is the greatest advantage of the new generation technologies that can capture CO2 from the air? GC: These technologies build carbon negative power plants, such as Global Thermostat, that clean the atmosphere of CO2 while producing electricity. Global Thermostat is a firm that is commercializing a technology that takes CO2 out of air and uses mostly low cost residual heat rather than electricity to drive the capture process, making the entire process of capturing CO2 from the atmosphere very inexpensive. There is enough residua heat in a coal power plant that it can be used to capture twice as much CO2 as the plant emits, thus transforming the power plant into a “carbon sink.” For example, a 400 MW coal plant that emits 1 million tons of CO2 per year can become a carbon sink absorbing a net amount of 1 million tons of CO2 instead. Carbon capture from air can be done anywhere and at any time, and so inexpensively that the CO2 can be sold for industrial or commercial uses such as plastics, food and beverages, greenhouses, bio-fertilizers, building materials and even enhanced oil recovery, all examples of large global markets and profitable opportunities. Carbon capture is powered mostly by low (85°C) residual heat that is inexpensive, and any source will do. In particular, renewable (solar) technology can power the process of carbon capture. This can help advance solar technology and make it more cost-efficient. This means more energy, more jobs, and it also means economic growth in developing nations, all of this while cleaning the CO2 in the atmosphere. Carbon negative technologies can literally transform the world economy. MR: One final question. You distinguish between long-run and short-run strategies in the effort to reverse climate change. Would carbon negative technologies be part of a short-run strategy? GC: Long-run strategies are quite different from strategies for the short-run. Often long-run strategies do not work in the short run and different policies and economic incentives are needed. In the long run the best climate change policy is to replace fossil fuel sources of energy that by themselves cause 45% of the global emissions, and to plant trees to restore if possible the natural sources and sinks of CO2. But the fossil fuel power plant infrastructure is about 87% of the power plant infrastructure and about $45-55 trillion globally. This infrastructure cannot be replaced quickly, certainly not in the short time period in which we need to take action to avert catastrophic climate change. The issue is that CO2 once emitted remains hundreds of years in the atmosphere and we have emitted so much that unless we actually remove the CO2 that is already there, we cannot remain long within the carbon budget, which is the concentration of CO2 beyond which we fear catastrophic climate change. In the short run, therefore, we face significant time pressure. The IPCC indicates in its 2014 5th Assessment Report that we must actually remove the carbon that is already in the atmosphere and do so in massive quantities, this century (p. 191 of 5th Assessment Report). This is what I called a carbon negative approach, which works for the short run. Renewable energy is the long run solution. Renewable energy is too slow for a short run resolution since replacing a $45-55 trillion power plant infrastructure with renewable plants could take decades. We need action sooner than that. For the short run we need carbon negative technologies that capture more carbon than what is emitted. Trees do that and they must be conserved to help preserve biodiversity. Biochar does that. But trees and other natural sinks are too slow for what we need today. Therefore, negative carbon is needed now as part of a blueprint for transformation. It must be part of the blueprint for Sustainable Development and its short term manifestation that I call Green Capitalism, while in the long run renewable sources of energy suffice, including Wind, Biofuels, Nuclear, Geothermal, and Hydroelectric energy. These are in limited supply and cannot replace fossil fuels. Global energy today is roughly divided as follows: 87% is fossil, namely natural gas, coal, oil; 10% is nuclear, geothermal, and hydroelectric, and less than 1% is solar power — photovoltaic and solar thermal. Nuclear fuel is scarce and nuclear technology is generally considered dangerous as tragically experienced by the Fukushima Daichi nuclear disaster in Japan, and it seems unrealistic to seek a solution in the nuclear direction. Only solar energy can be a long term solution: Less than 1% of the solar energy we receive on earth can be transformed into 10 times the fossil fuel energy used in the world today. Yet we need a short-term strategy that accelerates long run renewable energy, or we will defeat long-term goals. In the short term as the IPCC validates, we need carbon negative technology, carbon removals. The short run is the next 20 or 30 years. There is no time in this period of time to transform the entire fossil infrastructure — it costs $45-55 trillion (IEA) to replace and it is slow to build. We need to directly reduce carbon in the atmosphere now. We cannot use traditional methods to remove CO2 from smokestacks (called often Carbon Capture and Sequestration, CSS) because they are not carbon negative as is required. CSS works but does not suffice because it only captures what power plants currently emit. Any level of emissions adds to the stable and high concentration we have today and CO2 remains in the atmosphere for years. We need to remove the CO2 that is already in the atmosphere, namely air capture of CO2 also called carbon removals. The solution is to combine air capture of CO2 with storage of CO2 into stable materials such as biochar, cement, polymers, and carbon fibers that replace a number of other construction materials such as metals. The most recent BMW automobile model uses only carbon fibers rather than metals. It is also possible to combine CO2 to produce renewable gasoline, namely gasoline produced from air and water. CO2 can be separated from air and hydrogen separated from water, and their combination is a well-known industrial process to produce gasoline. Is this therefore too expensive? There are new technologies using algae that make synthetic fuel commercially feasible at competitive rates. Other policies would involve combining air capture with solar thermal electricity using the residual solar thermal heat to drive the carbon capture process. This can make a solar plant more productive and efficient so it can out-compete coal as a source of energy. In summary, the blueprint offered here is a private/public approach, based on new industrial technology and financial markets, self-funded and using profitable greenmarkets, with securities that utilize carbon credits as the “underlying” asset, based on the KP CDM, as well as new markets for biodiversity and water providing abundant clean energy to stave off impending and actual energy crisis in developing nations, fostering mutually beneficial cooperation for industrial and developing nations. The blueprint proposed provides the two sides of the coin, equity and efficiency, and can assign a critical role for women as stewards for human survival and sustainable development. My vision is a carbon negative economy that represents green capitalism in resolving the Global Climate negotiations and the North–South Divide. Carbon negative power plants and capture of CO2 from air and ensure a clean atmosphere together innovation and more jobs and exports: the more you produce and create jobs the cleaner becomes the atmosphere. In practice, Green Capitalism means economic growth that is harmonious with the Earth resources.

### 1NC - Growth---Laundry List

#### It’s sustainable.

Radelet ’16 (Steven; February 2016; Ph.D. and M.P.P. from Harvard University, B.A. from Central Michigan University, Distinguished Professor of the Practice of Development, and is Director of the Global Human Development Program at Georgetown University, former Professor of Government and Economics at Harvard University, former economic advisor to President Sirleaf of Liberia; Foreign Affairs, “Prosperity Rising,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-14/prosperity-rising)

Since the early 1990s, daily life in poor countries has been changing profoundly for the better: **one billion people** have escaped extreme poverty, average **incomes have doubled**, infant death **rates have plummeted**, millions more girls have enrolled in school, **chronic hunger** has been cut almost in half, deaths from malaria and other diseases have declined dramatically, **democracy has spread** far and wide, and the incidence of war—even with Syria and other conflicts—has fallen by half. This unprecedented progress goes way beyond China and India and has touched hundreds of millions of people in dozens of developing countries across the globe, from Mongolia to Mozambique, Bangladesh to Brazil. Yet few people are aware of these achievements, even though, in aggregate, they rank among the **most important in human history**. In 2013, the Swedish survey organization Novus Group International asked Americans how they thought the share of the world’s population living in extreme poverty had changed over the last two decades. Sixty-six percent of respondents said that they thought it had doubled, and another 29 percent said that it hadn’t changed. Only five percent knew (or guessed) the truth: that the share of people living in extreme **poverty had fallen by half**. Perhaps that ignorance explains why Washington has done so little to take advantage of these promising trends, giving only tepid support to nascent democracies, making limited investments in economic development and in new health and agricultural technologies, and failing to take the lead in building more **effective international institutions**. Whatever the reason, many developing countries are now responding to what they perceive as the United States’ indifference by looking elsewhere—especially toward China—for deeper engagement and advice on how to keep growing. At the same time, climate change, the slowdown in global growth, and rising tensions in the Middle East and beyond have begun to **threaten further progress**. As a result, the United States now risks missing out on a **historic chance** to strengthen its global leadership and help create a safer, more prosperous, and more democratic world—just at the moment when it could help the most. ONE GIANT LEAP Global poverty is falling faster today than at any time in human history. In 1993, about two billion people were trapped in extreme poverty (defined by the World Bank as living on less than $1.90 per day); by 2012, that number had dropped to less than one billion. The industrialization of China is a big part of the story, of course, but even excluding that country, the number of extreme poor has fallen by more than 400 million. Since the 1980s, **more than 60 countries** have reduced the number of their citizens who are impoverished, even as their overall populations have grown. This decline in poverty has gone hand in hand with much **faster economic growth**. Between 1977 and 1994, the growth in per capita GDP across the developing countries averaged zero; since 1995, that figure has shot up to three percent. Again, the change is widespread: between 1977 and 1994, only 21 developing countries (out of 109 with populations greater than one million) exceeded two percent annual per capita growth, but between 1995 and 2013, 71 such countries did so. And going backward has become much less common: in the earlier period, more than 50 developing countries recorded negative growth, but in the later one, just ten did. The **improvements in health** have been even bigger. In 1960, 22 percent of children in developing countries died before their fifth birthday, but by 2013, only five percent did. Diarrhea killed five million children a year in 1990 but claimed fewer than one million in 2014. **Half as many people** now **die** from malaria as did in 2000, and deaths from tuberculosis and AIDS have both dropped by a third. The share of people living with chronic hunger has fallen by almost half since the mid-1990s. **Life expectancy** at birth in developing countries has **lengthened by** nearly **one-third**, from 50 years in 1960 to 65 years today. These improvements in health have left no country untouched, even the worst-governed ones. Consider this: the rate of child death has declined in every single country (at least those where data are available) since 1980. Meanwhile, far more children are enrolling in and completing school. In the late 1980s, only 72 percent of all primary-school-age children attended school; now, the figure exceeds 87 percent. Girls in developing countries have enjoyed the biggest gains. In 1980, only half of them finished primary school, whereas four out of five do so today. These leaps in education are beginning to translate into better-skilled workers. Then there is the shift to democracy. Prior to the 1980s, most developing countries were run by left- or right-wing dictators. Coups and countercoups, violence and assassinations, human rights abuses—all formed part of regular political life. But starting in the 1980s, dictators began to fall, a process that accelerated after the Cold War. In 1983, only 17 of 109 developing countries qualified as democracies, based on data from Freedom House and the Center for Systemic Peace; by 2013, the number had **more than tripled**, to 56 (and that’s not counting the many more developing countries with populations of less than one million). As those numbers suggest, power today is far more likely to be transferred through the ballot box than through violence, and elections in most countries have become fairer and more transparent. Twenty years ago, few Indonesians could have imagined that a furniture maker from central Java would beat one of Suharto’s relatives in a free and fair election, as Joko Widodo did in 2014. Nor would many have predicted that Nigeria, then still under military rule, would in 2015 mark its first peaceful transfer of power between parties, or that Myanmar (also called Burma) would hold its most successful democratic election the same year. Across the developing world, individual freedoms and rights are honored to a much greater degree, human rights **abuses are rarer**, and legislative bodies have more power. Yes, many of these new democracies have problems. And yes, the march toward democracy has slowed since 2005—and even reversed in some countries, such as Thailand and Venezuela. But in many more—from Brazil to Mongolia to Senegal—democracy has deepened. Never before in history have so many **developing countries been so democratic**. As states have become wealthier and more democratic, **conflict and violence** within them have declined. Those who think otherwise should remember that as recently as the 1980s and early 1990s, much of the world was aflame, from Central America to Southeast Asia to West Africa. There were half as many civil wars in the last decade as there were in the 1980s, and the number of people killed in armed conflicts has **fallen by three-quarters**. Three major forces sparked this great surge in development progress. First, the end of the Cold War brought an end to the superpowers’ support for some of the world’s nastiest dictators and reduced the frequency of conflict. As ideas about economic and political governance began to change, developing countries introduced more market-based economic systems and more democracy. Second, globalization created vast new opportunities for economic growth. Increased flows of trade, investment, information, and technology created more jobs and improved living standards. Third, new and more effective leaders—in politics, business, religion, and civil society—began to forge deep change. Where courageous figures, such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, stepped forward, countries progressed; where old-style dictators, such as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, remained in power, countries languished. This **incredibly wide-ranging progress** should not obscure the considerable work that remains: progress has not reached everyone, everywhere. One billion people still live in extreme poverty, six million children die every year from preventable diseases, too few girls get the education they deserve, and too many people suffer under dictatorships. Countries such as Haiti, North Korea, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe lag far behind. But the fact remains that an **enormous transformation** is under way—one that has already substantially improved the lives of hundreds of millions of people. WIN-WIN The United States should welcome and encourage this progress. For starters, broad-based development **enhances global security**. It is not true that poverty necessarily breeds terrorism, as some argue—after all, most poor people are not terrorists, and many terrorists are not poor. But it is true that poor states tend to be weak states unable to prevent **terrorist and criminal networks** from operating on their soil. Sustained development strengthens government institutions and reduces the need for outside intervention. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it, “Development is a lot cheaper than sending soldiers.” Development also builds states’ capacities to fight pandemic disease. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were overwhelmed by Ebola in 2014 largely because they all had weak health systems. The same was true in many of the countries hit hardest by the HIV/AIDS epidemic decades ago. As poor countries grow wealthier, however, they become better equipped to **fight diseases** that can spread quickly beyond their borders. A more prosperous developing world also benefits the U.S. economy. The spread of economic growth creates **new markets** for American businesses not just in China but also in Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and beyond. Developing countries are buying more and more aircraft, automobiles, semiconductors, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, consultancy services, and entertainment. Although the growth in trade with developing countries has slowed during the last year, their economies will no doubt remain major market opportunities for U.S. companies. In 1990, such states accounted for one-third of the global economy; today, their share is half, and they purchase more than half of U.S. exports. In 2011, Walmart spent $2.4 billion to acquire a controlling share of a holding company that operates more than 350 retail stores in South Africa and 11 other African countries, signaling a level of interest in African consumers that would have been unimaginable two decades ago. To be sure, emerging markets also create competition for U.S. businesses and hardship for American workers who lose their jobs as a result. But they also create many new jobs, as American firms expand abroad and as companies in the developing world send more capital to the West. Moreover, developing countries are increasingly coming up with their own **innovations** and **technologies**, in medicine, agriculture, energy, and more. The United States should respond to this growing competition not with protectionism but by strengthening its own capacities: rebuilding its **infrastructure, improving** its **educational** system, and investing in new technologies. Finally, development helps spread and deepen the values that Americans hold dear: openness, economic opportunity, democracy, and freedom. These values tend to go hand in hand with growing prosperity: as incomes rise, citizens demand greater freedoms. History suggests that even governments that do not welcome these ideas eventually embrace them or are replaced by those that do. And as more developing countries achieve progress under market-based economic systems and democracy, other countries seek to **emulate the model**. The United States and Europe have a strong self-interest in encouraging this process, since it will enhance global stability and add to the number of like-minded partners that can help address future challenges. SUSTAINING THE SURGE What makes all this progress especially impressive is that it has continued despite a number of major shocks that in an earlier age could well have stopped it: the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the 1980s, the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98, the 9/11 attacks, the global food crisis of 2007–8, and the global financial crisis of 2008. In each case, pundits predicted that the disaster of the day would set back progress. Yet in each case, the gains continued. There are good reasons to believe they can continue well into the future. The forces that sparked these **changes were fundamental**, not transitory. Governments have learned from their mistakes and gotten much better at managing inevitable downturns. Global integration has made critical technologies available to more and more people. **State institutions** have become more effective, with improved (if imperfect) legal systems, clearer property rights, and greater respect for individual liberties. Democratic rules and norms governing the transfer of political power, free speech, and accountability have become more deeply entrenched. Civil society groups are more active. These deep-seated changes have put enormous additional gains well within reach. If **economic growth proceeds** along the lines of most projections over the next two decades, some 700 million more people will escape extreme poverty. Per capita incomes in poor countries will double again, **millions of** childhood **deaths** will be avoided, **tens of millions** of children will get the education they deserve, hunger will decline, and basic rights and freedoms will spread further. At least, that’s what should happen—but none of these future gains is guaranteed. Growth has slowed markedly since 2008 in emerging economies such as Brazil and China and throughout the developing world. Russia, Thailand, and Venezuela have turned less democratic, and South Africa and Turkey seem to be headed in that direction as well. The Middle East has seen the return of conflict and **authoritarian rule**. China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea could **spark a major conflict** that could kill tens of thousands of people and devastate the region’s economies. Outbreaks of SARS and the H1N1 and Ebola viruses underscore humanity’s vulnerability to disease, and many doctors worry that growing resistance to antibiotics could reverse some of the hard-fought gains in health. Meanwhile, global population is on track to exceed nine billion by 2050, and the combination of more people, higher incomes, and warmer climates will place enormous strains on the world’s supplies of fresh water, food, and energy. Although there are ample grounds for pessimism, the doomsayers continue to **underestimate humanity’s growing ability** to cooperate in the face of new challenges. In the eighteenth century, when Thomas Malthus looked at population growth and foresaw catastrophic famine, he failed to appreciate the advances in agriculture, health, and governance that human ingenuity could create. The same was true for those that predicted a population disaster in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, the problems facing developing countries are plain to see, while the new ideas and innovations that will overcome them are harder to picture. Continued progress isn’t automatic or guaranteed. But with smart choices, it is within reach. LEADING BY EXAMPLE Most of the key choices will be made in developing countries themselves. Sustaining progress will require leaders there to reduce their countries’ dependence on natural resources, make their economies more inclusive, invest more in health and education, expand opportunities for women, and strengthen democracy and the rule of law. Yet the future of development will also **depend on the** actions of the **world’s leading countries**, since poorer countries can prosper only in a strong global system. The United States must do its part by regaining its economic leadership through major investments in infrastructure, education, and technological advances in health, agriculture, and alternative fuels. It must act to fix its long-term budget problems by improving the solvency of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid and strengthen the financial system through better regulation. The country must also do a much better job of leading by **example on democracy**. Deep political polarization, the lack of substantive debate, the unwillingness to compromise, misguided foreign policy adventurism, and the Great Recession have made liberal democracy look unattractive and ineffective. That malaise matters, because many developing countries are now engaged in a battle of ideas over which economic and political model they should follow. On the one side stands the model that has prevailed in the West since World War II: market capitalism coupled with **liberal democracy**. On the other is the model practiced by China, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and, increasingly, Russia, among others: state capitalism coupled with authoritarian rule. And there’s yet one more option, with a smaller but more dangerous following: religious fundamentalism, as promulgated by Iran and Saudi Arabia and groups such as the Islamic State (or ISIS) and Boko Haram in Nigeria. As the Western countries struggle and China continues to rise, authoritarian capitalism is becoming more appealing. Consider Beijing’s ties to Africa. China purchased $26 billion in imports from the continent in 2013; the United States purchased $9 billion. Chinese investment in Africa has been growing by 50 percent per year since 2000, whereas U.S. investment is growing by 14 percent per year. Make no mistake: many Africans still prefer to follow the American model and view China with suspicion. But those attitudes are beginning to shift, and Beijing’s apparent ability to get things done will only enhance China’s appeal, especially if Washington seems to talk big but deliver little. THE NEXT SURGE FORWARD Aside from the broader task of getting their own houses in order, the United States and other Western powers should also assert leadership in several specific areas to **keep the progress going**. The first is climate change, which presents one of the greatest threats to poverty reduction. Most of the world’s poor countries had little to do with creating the problem, yet they will bear the brunt of the damage. Rising sea levels, changing rainfall patterns, higher temperatures, and dwindling water supplies will derail progress, will undermine global food production, and could engender major conflict. Developing countries have an important role to play in curbing emissions, but they will not switch to low-carbon fuels and other clean technologies if their developed-world counterparts do not. Washington has taken important first steps to reduce power-plant emissions and raise automotive fuel-efficiency standards, but there is a very long way to go. Second, leading countries—especially the United States—should invest more in **technological innovation**. Much of the credit for recent improvements in living standards goes to vaccines, medicines, high-yielding seed varieties, cell phones, and the Internet. These new technologies (alongside old ones such as electricity and paved roads) have not yet reached everywhere, so simply making them more widely available would do wonders. But sustaining progress for the next several decades will also require **significant investments** in new vaccines, more powerful drugs, drought- and heat-resistant seeds, desalination techniques, and clean energy.

### 1NC - Growth -- Sustainable

#### The transition is inevitable and gradual but growth now is key to prevent a crash. Also, their cards lack robust studies

Weiss 17 [Martin Weiss, European Commission – Joint Research Centre, Directorate C – Energy, Transport and Climate, Sustainable Transport Unit. Also Written by Claudio Cattaneo, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies. Degrowth – Taking Stock and Reviewing an Emerging Academic Paradigm. March 15, 2017. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800916305900]

With the methodological limitations sketched in Section 2, the outcome of our review suggests that the history, concept, and rationale for degrowth are well explained. Yet, the largely descriptive academic discourse lacks rigid hypotheses testing through modelling and empirical assessments. By addressing the research questions and hypotheses identified in Section 5, the academic degrowth discourse could make an important contribution to the debate around a sustainable post-growth development (see also Escobar, 2015).

We expect that degrowth may only receive broader public support if the marginal benefits of the status quo become smaller than those of the next best degrowth scenario for large parts of the population. The degrowth discourse has qualitatively discussed the deficiencies of the status quo but spent little effort to quantify the costs of continued economic growth as well as the well-being benefits of degrowth.

Moreover, growth policies may not necessarily be abandoned on a finite planet earth. Instead, such policies may allow making maximum use of available resources (be it through expanded resource extraction, technological innovation, or increased commodification of society) in the short term, while in parallel enabling the development of means to cope with environmental limits in the long term. Drought in California arguably forced residential water consumption to decrease in 2014 by some 30% (Reese, 2015) without causing major social disruptions. Such a decrease may not have been achievable by appealing to voluntary frugality nor may have water-saving policies obtained sufficient public support by pointing out unsustainable water consumption. The observed water savings might be temporary but show the capacity of humans to adapt in face of acute resource shortage. The case also points to the importance of technology as a catalyst for factor substitution in production and consumption in response to environmental constraints.

To be successful, degrowth has to identify a concrete and inclusive development perspective (see Schwartzman, 2012) for the affluent and powerful elites and the marginalized poor. Direct benefits of degrowth might be experienced by consumers in areas where further growth has obviously become undesirable, such as in the health care industry as illustrated by Missoni (2015), in the food, nutrition and the agricultural sector, or in urban transportation. Degrowth could address psychological stress related to over consumption, long working hours, and the commodification of social relations and highlight the benefits of a simplified life style away from positional competition and towards more collaborative community development. Addressing life quality around resonant human interactions (Rosa, 2015) in face of increasing competition and individuation may be a viable angle to highlight the benefits of degrowth. Decreasing working time can mitigate environmental degradation (Knight et al., 2013; Fitzgerald et al., 2015) and provide a leverage point for virtually all other degrowth proposals. In fact, we would regard a decrease in working time as the single silver bullet through which degrowth can yield personal welfare gains, increase environmental sustainability, enhance democracy, and thus obtain the support of larger parts of the population. Yet, to be a fulfilling choice, reduced working time, and degrowth in more general, may hinge on a wider cultural recognition (see, e.g., Skidelsky and Skidelsky, 2012) that still appears to be hampered under the present societal conditions.

Kallis (2013) argues that societies have the capacity to steer social processes towards degrowth, thereby opposing the view of Sorman and Giampietro (2013) who consider that societies are destined to grow, crash, and adapt. We see a larger and more differentiated space of development to which the degrowth discourse contributes visions for both social and economic adaptation and the mitigation of environmental impacts. In a resource-constraint world, degrowth may occur as a gradual and locally-specific transition (Buch-Hansen, 2014). We argue with Ott (2012) in favor of political prudence through addressing specific problems with specific policies and against the pursuit of grand new utopias that often come with unintended consequences.

### 1NC – Decoupling

#### IEA studies and empirics prove that universal decoupling is occuring --- global emissions have stalled for years despite consistent growth

**Riti** et. al **17** [Joshua Sunday Riti, School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Jos, “Decoupling CO2 emission and economic growth in China: Is there consistency in estimation results in analyzing environmental Kuznets curve?”, Journal of Cleaner Production Volume 166, 10 November 2017, Pages 1448-1461, Science Direct]

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), universal carbon dioxide-greenhouse gas related emissions shows some stability in 2015 at approximately 32.1 Gt for the second year in a row, validating the decoupling of global greenhouse gas emissions and economic growth (Enerdata, 2015; Itskos et al., 2016). The stalling of global emissions is no surprise, as this is in line with the slowing trend in annual emission growth over the past three years, starting from 2.0% in 2013 to 1.1% in 2014 and further down to 0.1% in 2015. A similar trend of declining growth in global emissions could also be seen from 2010 to 2012, starting from 5.7% down to 0.7%. It is debatable whether the plateaued emission level will continue and results from structural changes (Jackson et al., 2016; Qi et al., 2016; Green and Stern, 2016). In 2009, a stronger global downward trend of 1.0% was recorded, compared to 2008 levels, but this was due to the global economic downturn. Stalling in emissions is not coupled with the GDP trend, as global GDP kept up with an annual growth of 3.0% in 2015 compared to 2014. A more structural change with a shift away from carbon-intensive activities, particularly in China but also in the United States, contributed considerably to this trend. This achievement was made possible through the global investment in energy efficiency which increased by 6% in 2015 (IEA, 2010) and the rise in the proportion of renewables in the generation of power. It is estimated that the share of renewables was around 90 percent of the latest power generation in year 2015, with power from wind alone responsible for over 50 percent.

### 1NC – Not signs

#### Their ev disproves that signs and symbols are the problem – rather world bank, labor laws, and structural adjustment policeis which they cant change – cal inserts blue

Salem 2020 [M, *Women through the development gaze of the World Bank: legal reforms and the myth of empowerment in the Global South* [Master’s thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain]BUDebate

The World Bank, in effect, is a place where both human rights and economic development intersect, with a particular emphasis on women’s right to development as a universal right aided by the establishment of the legal tools supporting this such as CEDAW, which is strongly promoted by the World Bank model. Furthermore, the feminists of the World Bank hinge the entire success of the gender equality as smart economics framework on those conditional legal reforms that enhance the empowerment of those women in the Global South into the market and support them against their traditional and culture barriers. Thus from this point of view those legal reforms are supposed to enhance the overall lives of those women and end the violence that is they suffer from within their households.

However, as depicted throughout this chapter the end results are actually contradictory to this view and those women in the Global South actually end up suffering further violence that emerges from this framework, with those laws actually establishing the ideal environment for the private corporates to accumulate their power. The main argument here as Rittich emphasizes, that these legal reforms and conditions contribute to the restructuring of the society in a disproportionate manner.250

This particularly indicates how the power of the corporates is legitimized under the smart economics discourse. This is because the burden falls mainly on women in the Global South given their increased reliance on unpaid reproductive work or nonmarket sphere, as indicated in the case of Bangladesh earlier. Furthermore, these legal reforms are mainly implemented to remove all the barriers facing the corporates in maximizing their trade and profit with the cheap labor of these women. At another level, these legal reforms establish further divisions between local and global communities as they benefit only a certain sector of women. 251The main argument in here is that these legal reforms are the main reason for the success of this entire discourse.

They pave the way for the private sector and remove all the required barriers so that they can maximize their profits from those “underutilized” women that became visible under the development gaze and are now the main source of income generators in the newly formed assembly lines. Thus these legal reforms that are disguised under the myth of achieving gender equality and breaking the social barriers for women actually complement the transition of those “trained” young women into the waged labor market without affecting their unwaged labor in the household. Accordingly, this increases the burden and further exploits those women in the Global South, who became trapped in this new identity that has been created for them.

Critical feminists believe that women are currently suffering a “disproportionate cost” due to their countries’ integration into the global economy with all of its required universal reforms to achieve trade liberalization and reach the idea of free market.252 As indicated earlier, the neoliberal agenda, which this feminism of the World Bank is built on, rests on the view that the benefits of liberal trade and open market are beyond dispute. The main reason is that alternatives to market-driven growth and participation in the global economy no longer represent viable routes to development.253

Accordingly, there is no room for government intervention in this new approach; moreover, since the Third World states are in severe debt, they had to comply with the entire package. The 2012 WDR stresses that the successful pursuit of economic development is now explicitly conceived as a matter of law, institutions, and good governance.254 Even though the main intention behind structural adjustment programs is to enhance the overall standard of living and achieve economic growth, critical feminists argue that they have actually destroyed women’s livelihood by making it impossible for them to reproduce their families and themselves.255The new gender related legislative changes actually sustained patriarchy at home.

All of this was depicted throughout the illustration of Bangladesh, after the application of those legal reforms under the NARIA initiative that was following the framework prescribed by smart economics, those women in the textile industry were left with no guarantees, short term contracts, low wages, no security and forced to work under very harsh conditions for very long hours to meet their targets and the situation is even worse during high seasons. In addition, they still remain bound to the tasks within their homes, which presents an ongoing process of primitive accumulation. There were no formal recruitment policies, health insurance or any benefits that should be given to the employees in the labor market, which is definitely not the case in the Global North.

The World Bank is taking advantage of the fact that those countries are in great need of those loans to cover their debts and are forced to accept all of those legal preconditions. Thus the only difference is that women under this discourse are forced to hold more than one job under the myth they that are being empowered and supported with these laws. These laws actually lure the private companies to invest more and maximize their profits. It also satisfies the underlying neoliberal agenda of the World Bank and also enables them to publish their success stories of those “empowered” women in the Global South and achieving their goals with respect to women’s right to development and gender equality on the international plane, hiding the invisible truth about the real impact of those legal reforms on those women.

Kennedy argues that law in liberal capitalist societies plays a dominant role in the ideology function, for it establishes the idea of formal equity and helps to “bind the interests and beliefs of subordinate groups to those of the dominant class.”256This builds on the previous arguments about the accumulation of power that were made throughout this chapter. Moreover, the perception of global universalization and promotion of freedom, democracy, and equality bestows on legal norms a wider authority unmatched by any other instrumental advantage previously given to the dominant class.257Thus, legal reforms can be seen as a perfect tool that further empowers the already dominant class in the society while keeping the other segments in the weaker position. This guarantees the success of this whole program and keep further empower the dominant ones through these reforms. Thus those legal reforms in addition to the particular way that those women have become visible through the development gaze of the World Bank ensure the continuing accumulation of power of the private corporates who set the rules of the market and the subjectivity of those women in the Global South.

Law and institutions have not always been central to the development efforts of international financial institutions. It is only since the 1990s that the absence of adequate legal and regulator institutions has been identified as a barrier to overall targets of development projects.258 Rittich argues that legal reforms accompanying the development packages had several effects. First, they raised the importance of including law in rescue packages, resulting in the comparative legal developments and spread of legal transplants under the guise of economic growth.259 In reform projects freedom and democracy are linked to the presence of markets, the invocation of the rule of law and the deployment of the language that provides the basis for corporates.260

In addition, the operation also works in reverse neoliberal policies and institutional proposals then become embedded in dominant ideas about the rule of law simplicity associated with the legal requirements of a market economy thereby strengthened and normalized. 261This in particular establishes a disadvantage for women in particular, as the neoliberal system is structured in away that allocates significant resources and power to investors, entrepreneurs and other capital holders, while other parties are left suffering the consequences of this unequally structured model.262Second these legal, and economic reforms that are transmitted through financial institutions are actually considered to be “the most important face of international law in the Global South.”263

Therefore, this is just another form of capitalization and tool that is used to liberate the economies of the developing world in favor. This facilitates trade for foreign investor, regardless of its impacts on the recipient country and whether or not these actual transplants will be suitable with the conditions in these countries. Rittich uses this analysis as a foundation to explain how the neoliberal reforms can result in establishing a disadvantage for women during the transition phase, for their livelihoods becomes more vulnerable after being strongly dependent on the government’s services and employment previously.264

A widespread notion often promoted in the neoliberal agenda is that resources are equally shared among all household members. Refuting this idea, Rittich argues those external changes in the market and polices directly impact the household and affects the distribution of resources differently.265 Consequently, the burden of these reforms tends to fall heavily and unequally on women, both within the actual family unit and outside in the highly competitive labor market. A great part of the systematic disadvantage stems from the way that different productive activities, both paid and unpaid, are organized based on the naturally inherent characteristics attributed to women, as described earlier, that are dependent on the role of women in the productive and reproductive sphere.266These disadvantages are then amplified by “efficiency-enhancing” strategies that increase the dependence required of individuals and households. In consequence, they increase the amount of unpaid labor and often the paid labor of women, thereby adding to women’s efforts and oppression. These gendered outcomes are a common feature of neoliberal reforms, as argued throughout this particular chapter.

In other words, these particular legal and institutional reforms support women’s oppression by re-allocating resources and entitlements and reducing the amount of

cross- subsidization for reproductive labor. Thus further increases the burden on women who are deeply affected by new policy decisions and legal entitlements. Roberts contends that the law plays an important role in the process of gendering economic activity.267 Therefore, this is why it becomes essential to understand the historical connection between the interdependence of the productive activity on the market and the uncompensated reproductive or non-productive forms of labor found within the household and naturally imposed on women. This is due to women’s traditional role that confined them to the domestic sphere, giving rise to certain social and nurturing characteristics typical of the patriarchal system until today.

It follows, then, that such legislative reforms support the more powerful elements in the society, which is male-dominated and controlled by the multinational Western corporates. Thus the main argument here is that individuals are not randomly placed in this society; on the contrary, the distribution of people both within the private and public sphere is based on political and economic reasons for the success of the neoliberal system.268 These reforms actually generate further separation and divisions within women both globally and within a particular society. Furthermore, these new legal reforms actually benefited educated middle-class and upper class women, but the women in the low-skilled or unskilled factory and new assembly service sector jobs were not legally protected, but actually left vulnerable and exploited to the deadlines and meeting the desired targets of production. So instead of achieving gender equality those reforms actually further increased inequalities between women in the same society and globally. This was clearly indicated in the example of Bangladesh, those women suffered from harsh working condition and long working hours with almost nothing in return on top of their already exiting unpaid job at home.

2. Direct Conditionalities and their Impact on Women in the Global South

The legal reforms are divided into two parts direct and indirect conditionalities and the impact of each of them on the shaping the lives of women in the Global South will be analyzed separately in the coming part. Structural adjustment policies and other forms of conditional lending have proved to be disruptive to both households and labor markets, as many of these reforms were introduced in recent decades.269 Not only do these reforms pose direct challenges to the household that further overwhelm women, but they may also force them to decrease their spending and several other aspects reliant on government subsidies.

Moreover, labor laws, in particular, are directly affected by these new reforms; where labor laws and regulations have traditionally been in the hands of state legislators and enforcers, they have been superseded by new international labor standards that are channeled through the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank.270 Again, the boundaries between domestic and international are increasingly blurred since environmental standards and labor regulation in the domestic domain are now influenced by the World Bank under the framework of gender equality as smart economics.

The consequences of conditionality have often been mistakenly believed to be primarily financial.271However, labor rights or labor law reforms have become a basis for dismantling and undermining labor law, despite also serving as a tool for the promotion and implementation of the same. But the main argument here is that conditionalities as imposed in the current framework of smart economics work to further undermine already vulnerable women while actually empowering those at the top of the socio-economic hierarchy, according to Federici.272 Furthermore, these conditionalities are used to undermine and control debt-riddled states as a constant reminder of the dire consequences should they fail to meet these specific conditions.273

### 1NC – Truth Possible

#### Communication and truth are possible

Quirk, 17—The New School, Information Technology Manager (Michael, “The Resuscitation of Truth,” <http://www.publicseminar.org/2017/05/the-resuscitation-of-truth/#.WWK-7xMrK8U>, dml)

Being indignant about a “post-truth” world is entirely justifiable. But I am not sure that grumbling about a widely distributed oblivion toward the true, the factual, and the objective accomplishes anything other than frustration and anxiety. Railing about facts rarely convinces anyone predisposed toward ignoring them, and this is not exactly news. As Upton Sinclair put it: “it is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it.” What goes for salaries goes double for worldviews and triple for satisfying pipedreams. While there may seem to be something quixotic about persuading the stubborn, it is timid to avoid that task, however fruitless it might turn out to be. Maybe, as the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre once quipped, the only thing that works with persistent skeptics or relativists is to tell them “go away.” But that reply is understandable only as a last resort, because I think a solid, pragmatic case can be made that objectivity, fact, and truth are live, forced, and momentous options that can be given a successful defense. Because the defense is pragmatic, rather than theoretical, it is an argument that works because it can be defended on the same grounds as the nihilist’s, even if they are armed with “alternative facts” tailored to their worldview. Thus if this defense fails to persuade them, it is no fault of yours. Rather, skeptics, relativists, and nihilists don’t and can’t really believe what they say they believe, because what they do puts the lie to it. They fail to practice what they preach, and they cannot but fail given the constraints of human discursive conduct. Pragmatists are often caricatured as being indifferent toward objectivity and relativistic about truth, but unlike their postmodernist cousins they are supposedly “cheerful nihilists.” Most pragmatists are widely thought to affirm Richard Rorty’s offhand (and incautious) remarks like “truth is what our peers will let us get away with saying”, or that we would do well to “reduce objectivity to solidarity.” Rorty seemed at times to place everything in the hands of the local, cultural beliefs of a given epistemic community, which is the first and final court of appeal for what counts as “fact.” If this is what Rorty believes (I think there is ample textual evidence that it is not) then all facts are “alternative facts,” indexed to the actual assertions of a given community. It is therefore inevitable that Trump’s base and his fiercest critics will simply talk past each other. Persuasion implies enough common ground to agree on certain key premises of argument, and since this is precisely what is lacking, quibbling about truth and objectivity is pointless. Does this torpedo any conception of truth and objectivity that is not, in Swain’s words, “rhetorical or rooted in perspective”? Robert Brandom, is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, and was a student of Rorty’s at Princeton. He shares Rorty’s antifoundationalism and also self-identifies as a pragmatist. Nevertheless, he believes that Rorty’s views do not support the sort of “post-truth” philosophy he is often accused of having, and which he unwittingly supports when he tries to shock rather than patiently construct persuasive arguments. Brandom’s philosophical project, in his magnum opus Making It Explicit and other works, can be seen as an attempt to knock off the rough edges of Rorty’s pragmatism and to refashion it as a systematic philosophy of language that makes sense of truth and objectivity, and not just an “edifying” philosophy that provides groundless epistemic hope without “metaphysical comfort.” Any post-truth regime would be over before it starts. Making It Explicit contains over 700 pages of dense, complex prose written in an intensely technical analytic style. (If you can imagine the late modal logician David Lewis rewriting Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, you might have some idea of how Making It Explicit reads.) But there are two strands that can be teased out of Brandom’s reflections on language that are directly relevant to contemporary Trumpian politics and its oblivion of truth and objectivity. First, Brandom follows C.S. Peirce and Donald Davidson in drawing a sharp distinction between truth and justification. This distinction is rooted in our practices of making claims, defending them with reasons, and withdrawing those claims when evidence or argument shows them to be baseless. To use the most common example: I would be justified, if I were an 11th century cloistered monk, in believing that the earth was at the center of the universe. I could cite many reasons for this belief that could support this belief and command assent: the best available astronomical science of the day, scriptural testimony, and the ordinary experience of watching the sun, stars, and planets rise in the east and set in the west. The belief is held to be true, and the monk is justified in believing it true, but as a matter of fact, it is false. The relationship between justification and truth is a complicated and important one, but neither concept can be reduced to the other. I could be justified in believing X which turns out not to be true, and for that matter I can believe Y, which is true, without being justified in believing it — my facts could be wrong, my reasoning could be off. What Brandom is drawing our attention to is the sound linguistic practice involved in the giving and assessing of reasons. What we call “rational discourse” will involve weighing and evaluating our own reasons and that of others, responding to challenges and revising or even dropping our own convictions. There is no foggy metaphysical speculation or transcendental deduction behind Brandom’s truth/justification distinction. It is simply an unavoidable part of human sapience as expressed in our discursive practices. Second, sapient human discourse invariably involves norms, elements of discursive practice that distinguish valid from invalid “moves”, and that enable participants in the practice to both track and evaluate those moves as better or worse. “Moves” in discursive practices are usually inferences: I draw conclusions from premises to which I am committed, and therefore are committed to the conclusions as well; I track the claims and inferences of other participants in the dialogue, and gauge whether (or to what extent) they too are entitled to their own commitments. So rational discourse centers around the inferences we draw, inferences that emerge from the sapient social practice of making claims and engaging in what Brandom calls “deontic scorekeeping”, employing shared practical norms to assess entitlements and commitments of fellow participants, and ourselves. Meaningful human discourse, then, is a) constrained by shared norms that b) guide inferences articulating one’s commitments that c) one may or may not be entitled to hold. Our judgment of how well we, and our conversation partners, avoid error or get things right is what Brandom calls a “normative status” — a judgment that someone is entitled to believe or assert something. Those beliefs to which one is committed one takes to be true (what sense does it make to say “I believe X but it’s false”?), but I am entitled to those beliefs only to the extent that I can justify them. In discursive practices, we hold ourselves and others responsible for the commitments we hold by determining whether we are entitled to them, whether the inferential moves made in the linguistic social practice pass muster with the norms that make the social practice what it is. There is, of course, something going on in discourse besides inference: there are also what Brandom dubs “discursive entry” and “discursive departure” moves. We are causally affected by non-linguistic beings, which cause not just sensations but perceptions, which give non-inferential access to the world but are possible only for sapient beings that are capable of drawing inferences from them and engaging in deontic scorekeeping. “Discursive entry/departure” moves anchor us to a world external to language, but it is the normative activity of holding ourselves responsible to the inferences drawn from these moves that constitutes “objectivity.” Brandom was deeply influenced by many other philosophers in developing this “social practice” conception of objectivity: Wittgenstein’s “meaning-as-use” trope, Heidegger’s notion of Dasein as “Being-in-the-world,” Sellars’s rejection of “the Myth of the Given” and his epistemology of “the logical space of reasons.” Brandom leverages this account of the primacy of social practice into a comprehensive theory of meaning, where pragmatic ideas like “inference”, “commitment” and “entitlement” are primary, and semantic notions like “truth” and “reference” are derived from them, rather than the other way around, where meaning depends on a general theory of representation. For Brandom, we do not start out with a distinction between “subjectivity” and “objectivity” and then proceed to show how the objective world is correctly (and incorrectly) represented in subjective knowers, a path that has generated all manner of aporiae since Descartes and Locke. Rather, we establish the ebb and flow of human, sapient social practices, of assertion and reason-giving, and articulate “objectivity”, “fact”, and “truth” from there. This is obviously just a thumbnail sketch of a few main ideas in Making It Explicit. It is a book of many virtues: clarity and ease of expression is not one of them, however. Brandom is a philosopher’s philosopher: his work is crammed with philosophical “shop talk”, and it is difficult to show how this might be relevant to what another pragmatist, John Dewey, called “the problems of men” [sic] that philosophy must address if it is to remain a worthwhile endeavor. But I do not think the connection between Brandom’s musings and constructing an escape-route past “post-truth politics” is farfetched, and I do think there are several political lessons to be teased out of Brandom’s “inferentialism.” One of Brandom’s obsessive points about inference is the inescapable normativity of human discourse, and that such norms, like “holding oneself and others responsible for commitments made” are built-into discourse and shared in common. Put in the vernacular: if you want to talk politics and make sense, you have to recognize and honor these shared norms. You can’t just do or say whatever you want. You can’t just make shit up. The first political lesson to learn is: don’t let them gaslight you. By “them” I mean Trump and his base, their right-wing media enablers, and those critics like Barton Swain who give the former far too much credit for ushering in a supposedly postmodern “post-truth” regime. This is no time to get all wobbly about “truth”, “fact”, and “objectivity.” They are still meaningful, because discourse does not get off the ground without them. The post-truth regime is a mirage. The emperor has no clothes, so do not give him more power by fearing that the concept of truth has lost its resonance. The second lesson is to view objectivity not as something given, as something obvious, but as something one must achieve in social practices that involve the giving and taking of reasons. One of the many shortcomings of Hillary Clinton’s hapless campaign was her assumption that facts speak for themselves and that truth follows on their heels. This would be fine if this were a campaign like any other, where everybody is on the same page when it comes to holding both others in the dialogue and oneself responsible for commitments by appealing to shared norms. There has to be an attunement to the context of discussion. No attunement, no background norms, and no compelling appeals to facts. Dropping facts as if they were truth-bombs will not work if your adversaries are unwilling to recognize their force. Decontextualized facts convince no one, certainly not anyone spoon-fed by Fox and Breitbart and the right-wing echo chamber. Little truths are no match for “the big lie”. Third, what needs to be cultivated is not appeal to “the obvious”, but the disposition to take normative scorekeeping seriously — to hold every foot to the fire of showing one is entitled to the beliefs one claims to be true — and to make this manifest to others who might have lost their way. I think this is the most important lesson to be learned from Brandom’s magnum opus: that ultimately discourse is guided by a kind of ethical constraint, the need for both inferential consistency and inferential relevance, and a sort of guilt or shame when one deliberately fails to honor that constraint. So when Trump claims that he would have won the vote had there not been “millions of cases of voter fraud” in California, he needs to be able to back that commitment up in order to be entitled to it, and not just any reason will suffice given the nature of the norms guiding that kind of public discourse. Appealing to “alternative facts” as if they were givens, or insinuating “Lots of people said they witnessed voter fraud,” without saying who or citing sources, don’t cut the mustard, not so much because they “fly in the face of the facts” as that they betray a mammoth irresponsibility toward the norm-governed practice of justifying whatever one claims to be true in a manner consistent with shared standards of evidence and inference. There is something worthy of guilt and shame to fail to follow these norms. If Trump has no shame, which I think clearly is the case, one cannot assume that everyone in his base lacks it as well. It is thus wrong and counterproductive to accuse avid Trump supporters of stupidity. Partly because “Trump supporters” are a heterogeneous lot, and no one should assume that they all have the same axe to grind or the same sociopolitical agenda, and therefore can be dismissed in the manner of, say, a Bill Maher as a collection of Yahoos. But stupidity is not what is at stake here. A kind of irresponsibility is, though. For to talk of “alternative facts,” as Kellyanne Conway did, or to unthinkingly accept them as gospel, without acknowledging the social requirement of putting up good public reasons or shutting up, is to admit that either one does not mean what one says, or does not care one way or the other. It is not to play the game of political discourse by different rules. It is to refuse to play it at all. Some Trumpians fall into that category, I think. And that is a kind of ethical failure.

### 1NC - AT: Baudrillard

#### Baudrillard’s critique of representation and politics is wrong and shuts down resistance

Joseph Schwartz 8, Professor of Political Science at Temple University, The Future of Democratic Equality, 54-5

Lyotard and Baudrillard put forth a strong case for conceiving of postmodern capitalist culture as an economy of image-making. They both contend that the postmodern epoch transcends industrial production via the commodification of images and the “depthlessness” of the surface of postmodern human relationships. 33 But such a portrayal is too stark; the production of images has not supplanted the production of material use-values as the dominant form of capitalist production (and images themselves are “material” forms of production sold in the capitalist market). No doubt video games, “virtual reality,” and cyberspace are new forms of experience that compress and dislocate linear, physical conceptions of time and space. But while late capitalist “infotainment” production, at times, radically disjoins design and marketing (“symbolic manipulation”) from actual physical production (microchips designed in Silicon Valley while produced in Malaysia and the Philippines), the outsourcing of symbolic manipulation to software engineers in India and South Korea is rapidly breaking down this distinction.¶ But Lyotard’s and Derrida’s aestheticization of all reality equates not only philosophical texts with literary texts, but also treats material phenomenon as strictly texts read by the human mind. This tendency among post-structuralist influenced theorists leads them to downplay the structural constraints that systems of production—not only material, but also cultural and ideological— place upon human subjects. It also downplays the possibility for human communication, inter-subjectivity, and collective action. For Lyotard, the only social bond is linguistic; inter-subjective language does not yield a shared linguistic community, but an indeterminate number of language games. Yet, if reality consists solely of perpetually shifting fragments of failed representations, how can there be any communication, yet alone the comprehension of commands?34 If inter-subjective communication is impossible, then why and how do we write journal articles for our (admittedly small) intellectual communities? One need not be a Weberian to realize that “legitimate rule” depends more on the power to command—authority—than it does brute force. Such rules are rarely constructed in a truly democratic manner, as the unequal access to educational, social, and cultural capital decreases the possibility of democratic discourse among relatively well-informed equals. Yet much of the social glue that coheres contemporary societies remains conscious, shared human belief in communal norms and values—often ones that are as pre-modern (religious and ethnic conceptions of solidarity), as they are postmodern. The role of ideology as a form of communicative coherence has not withered away—nor has the material and ideological power of the state and of educational and legal systems. The social world in which we live is simply not as fragmented and de-situated as poststructural- influenced academics believe. In fact, the tight knit and cohesive nature of post-structural-influenced academic communities implicitly affirms philosophically “pragmatic” and communitarian conceptions of meaning more than they do post-structuralist theories of communicative fragmentation.

**1NC - AT: Affect – Useless**

#### Affect can’t explain political or social life

Megan **Boler 18** and Elizabeth Davis, Department of Social Justice Education, OISE/University of Toronto, May 2018, “The affective politics of the “post-truth” era: Feeling rules and networked subjectivity,” Emotion, Space and Society Volume 27, Pages 75-85

While the attention to affective attunement is **potentially useful**, in deploying a definition of affect as quantitative, pre-personal, non-conscious, and non-signifying, one is left with **myriad questions** about how particular emotions are **targeted**, **produced** and **manipulated** within the affective politics of digital media. Papacharissi characterizes affective transmission as follows: “So digital, among other media, invite and transmit affect but also sustain affective feedback loops that generate and reproduce affective patterns of relating to others that are further reproduced as affect — that is, intensity that has not yet been cognitively processed as feeling, emotion, or thought” (23). Following the popular reification of affect, Papacharissi sharply distinguishes affect from emotion (2015, 13). “Affect explains the intensity with which something is experienced; it refers to just that: intensity” (2015, 135). For her, affect is a central component of how stories are formed and circulated within media flows, and affect helps provide an index of how some stories end up being salient in social media, and thus potentially have more or less political impact. While this account of affect resonates prima facie with Hochschild's concept of “deep stories” and felt truths which shape the feeling rules we see defining partisan polarization, readers are **left wanting a full articulation** of the **significance** (rather than simply the **alleged presence**) of affect as it circulates in and through digital media. This reflects a **more widespread tendency** in much scholarship to invoke “affect” in Massumi's “autonomous” sense with **little exploration** of the **complex relational manifestations** of emotions.

Affect **all too often** becomes a **mystified idea** akin to force or energy and intimates an **abstract celebration** of the uncontainable:

Disorder, marginality, and anarchy present the habitat for affect, mainly because order, mainstreaming, and hierarchy afford form that compromises the futurity of affect. Because marginal spaces support the emergence of change, affect is **inherently political**, although it **does not conform** to the structures we symbolically internalize as political. Thus, per affect theory, empowerment lies in liminality, in pre-emergence and emergence, or at the point at which new formations of the political are in the process of being imagined but **not yet articulated**. The form of affective power is pre-actualized, networked, and of a liquid nature.(2015, 19)

“Affect” so understood **pales in analytical resonance** or **utility** in contrast with earlier feminist analyses of emotion, which, as in the bitterness example above, describe the **actual shape** and **flow** of social life as it is intersubjectively produced in **specific micro-** and **macro-political contexts** of power relations. The qualitative descriptions of “affect” in social media are conceptually overshadowed by the language of emotion — and yet emotions are presented as simply what people “express”, not a web of intersubjectively produced sociality (see, e.g., Papacharissi, 2015, 15, 22, 53–54). As a result, the account is able **only to suggest broad quantitative measures** of the rate and flow of retweets as exemplifying affect.10 Affect understood as “intensity” **all too often** gestures at something it **does not explain**, while using rhetorical strategies that **further mystify the term**.

### 1NC - AT: Theory

#### Their theory is holistically wrong, totalizing, and politically dangerous – the alt’s retreat into abstraction and symbolic interruptions only consolidates the worst parts of neoliberalism – prefer contingent solutions to violence

Goodfield 20 [Eric Lee Goodfield is Assistant Professor at the American University of Beirut, Civilization Studies Program and Department of Political Studies & Public Administration. Cultural Politics an International Journal · July 2020. "POSTMODERN PAPER TIGER.” https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342664224\_Postmodern\_Paper\_Tiger\_Lyotard\_Baudrillard\_and\_the\_Contemporary\_Politics\_of\_Poststructuralist\_Subversion]

In the midst of the cynical tide washing over Baudrillard’s thought, a problem for its sweeping claims arises from within. Despite the implosion of history, of universals, of meaning, and despite our postmodern apparatus of simulation and technological networks that seek to inhibit all change through control, the specter of change continues to loom. All of our attempts at circumscribing the past and future, of interring them in the present, do not necessarily foreclose on change. Indeed, diremption and “Hegelian history” are still possible beyond the hyperrealization and simulacra of the present. Despite his ontology of the structure of the society of simulacra, Baudrillard (1994: 9) confesses that there is no certainty that history will not reappear and again overtake us from behind our bulwarks of technological mastery, from “behind their futuristic technologies, behind their stores of information and inside the beehive networks of communication where time is at last wiped out by pure circulation, will perhaps never reawaken. But they do not know that.” The mechanisms, then, of postmodern hubris and control may be the seeds of its undoing. This then amounts to a kind of hidden shadow hovering over Baudrillard’s thoughts on the end of history and the event. Herein, Baudrillard’s thought on the collapse of history on the postmodern clock quietly launches two problematic claims. First, the claim that postmodern instrumentality and simulation have overtaken the event in perpetuity: eventually, the event may overtake them, and this is in line with his antihumanism. At the same time, his surrender to the inevitably destructive simulative capacities of postmodernity seems out of balance with his trampling on modern and Enlightenment forms of universality and truth—read humanism—that he dismisses as crushed hopes. To this extent he seems to dismiss the modern epoch past with the benefit of retrospection, all the while monumentalizing the power and capacities of the postmodern as seemingly unsurpassable. Only quietly and at the margins does he recognize the equal possibility that the unbound hubris of postmodern presentism and simulation, as well, may succumb to the time and events it seeks to command.

A second instructive problem of normative gesture arises for Baudrillard’s poststructuralist narrative. He describes and outlines an ontology of knowledge and power in his sketch of postmodernity. Here, within the epistemological boundaries of the postmodern condition, there is no access to the real where the “Perfect Crime no longer involves God, but Reality, and it is not a symbolic murder but an extermination” (Baudrillard 2000: 59). The perfect crime was the termination of the connection to or possibility of real historical chance, experience, or awareness and its supplantation by the virtual and the simulative. Baudrillard writes, “The corps(e) of the Real—if there is any—has not been recovered, is nowhere to be found” (48). Yet on this account, Baudrillard seems to cede too much to the postmodern and its critical perspectives: “We must no longer assume any principle of truth, of causality, or any discursive norm. Instead, we must grant both the poetic singularity of events and the radical uncertainty of events” (48). In this he shuns liberation or even progress and instead takes a poststructuralist stand, again, in linguistic creativity: “Truth no longer affords a solution. But perhaps we can aim at a poetic resolution of the world, of the kind promised by history or by language” (48). Despite the omnipresence and hegemony of digital communications, language itself, Baudrillard suggests, provides its own ground for resistance. Language and the rift of meaning, that gap between the representable and the real, amounts to an inevitable limitation on the simulative capacity for control and the derailment of history. Baudrillard here puts his poststructuralist hopes in the elusive nature of meaning insofar as no symbolic representation ever manages to surpass its subject: the real will always stand in juxtaposition to our attempts to subdue, reproduce, and replace it. In the seemingly hopeless condition of the end of history, Baudrillard argues that we take a stand in linguistic awareness, doubling, and the linguistic uncanny that he terms pataphysics. This response is based on the marginal hope that a few may revel in the contradictions that linguistic resistance and autonomy may offer as a means of finding refuge in the all-pervading condition of postmodernity.

Far from contending with the underlying causes of postmodernity, then, Baudrillard succumbs to its underlying assumptions—historical contingency, limitless pluralism, and discursive relativism—prior to carving out his position of resistance. History and reality themselves are ultimately illusory here, and this relies on a grand metaphysical speculation that asserts knowledge both historical and material (Baudrillard 1994: vi, 6, 70–77). That is, Baudrillard’s circumscription of the conditions of our ignorance suggests a kind of privileged access to formal totality, all the while lamenting its impenetrable content. In his mystification of our current historical plight, in which “it would seem that something has escaped us” at the “event horizon . . . beyond which nothing makes sense and nothing at all may be discovered,” we are reduced to compounding our political loss and disenchantment in the ironic and cynical resistance of pataphysics (Baudrillard 2000: 79–80). An impractical skepticism means that we have no levers with which to act but remain cynically vigilant of what we see before us: “Facing a world that is unintelligible and problematic . . . we must make that world even more unintelligible, even more enigmatic” (83). With Kellner (1989: 163), I am suggesting, then, that pataphysics endorses “a hyperconformity that will allow objects to follow their own laws and impulses, and sweep the subjects blindly along,” ultimately stripping them of any power to define and defend resistance as an end in itself and consummating alienation and the triumph of the object.

Yet against the claim of the complicity of Baudrillard’s pataphysical thought with liberal capitalist alienation and its historical finality, David Teh and Rex Butler have sought to make the inverse case for pataphysics in Baudrillard’s oeuvre, one they each hold must be made on his poetic terms. These authors argue that the seeming indifference to the iron cage of modern dislocation in Baudrillard is part and parcel of his poststructuralist response and attempt to surmount the problem through the irony of reversibility and impermanence. Pataphysics here is held up as a kind of rebellion against the real and the realist that simultaneously defies the association with political fatalism and stoicism that Kellner (1989: 164) charges it with. Teh (2006), through Butler, charges that the nihilism and nothingness at the core of Baudrillard’s pataphysical logic is “a philosophical position in favour of what is unknowable and reversible at the heart of the world, . . . opposed in every sense to the order of equivalence imposed by capitalism, with its imperative of predictability, its irreversible, linear accumulations of value and history.” In response, I argue that the charge of colluding with liberal capitalism, pressed against poststructuralist thought generally, and thinkers like Baudrillard in particular (as detailed above), is political and not merely philosophical or theoretical. That is, it is to recognize the substantial compatibilities with capitalism built into linguistically driven political theory. It is, as well, to acknowledge a reluctance to criticize existent liberal and neoliberal practices—read capitalist—as “principal sources of human disempowerment

and mechanisms of social domination” that are effectively endorsed by the rejection of the possibility of their structural analysis and a recalcitrance against imagining viable alternatives (Susen 2015: 257). Ultimately, then, the charge against pataphysical resistance is one that is as much of a presentism that conflates the end of history with the emergence of global neoliberalism as it is of the theoretical aloofness of Baudrillard’s pataphysics. The latter charge challenges his radical pataphysical contingence and ambivalence about political fate as a categorically flawed, if not oxymoronic, conception that effectively paralyzes political thought and practice beyond the world in which it finds itself.9

As a response to the crises of postmodern time and agency, pataphysics encloses actors within the confines of existing civil society. It limits their actions to idiosyncratic gestures of symbolic rebellion, denying meaningful resistance to the very sources of postmodern power and domination that Baudrillard has painstakingly fleshed out. Though he laments that contemporary capitalist society “is a market economy with no social force to battle against it, no competitive force to drive it on, . . . to propel it into the future,” his own pataphysical solution to the problem of resistance and “competition” brought on by capitalist hegemony is equally one of paralysis insofar as exclusion of the possibility of collective resistance—or any collectivity whatsoever—signals a termination of politics itself (Baudrillard 1994: 35–36). While pataphysics enacts antagonism to the political signifier of capitalist power—liberalism—it ultimately reproduces the parameters of liberal visions of civil society insofar as the latter’s emphasis on private right and diversity remains unchallenged and, in Western democracies, the sole domain for pataphysical expression and association beyond the state. Tellingly, Baudrillard explicitly embraces “liberty” as “a critical form” that “confronts the subject with his own alienation and its overcoming” (35–36), the very basis of his own ambivalent response (pataphysics) to the failed humanisms of communism and classical liberalism.

Given this entanglement with liberal thought and practice, pataphysics does very little to mitigate the conditions that sustain their hegemonic efficacies. This is so despite its deployment as a paradoxical short-circuiting of voluntary conformity with capitalism and its ideological cover story of liberalism, one that he considers “a vaccine against all radical temptations” (34). In comparison with Lyotard’s paralogical theory, as discussed above, which actively and passively reinforces the liberal tenets of agonism, difference, and autonomy, Baudrillard’s pataphysical vision of political agency formally mirrors the structural parameters of civil society, advances a dichotomy of public and private, and extends as far as an individualist atomism that celebrates the impossibility of consensus. In this sense his rebellion becomes one of resignation, resignification, and imagination that is more presentist hermitage than heretical to the terms of the capitalist contemporaneity he seems to be at odds with and seeking solace from.

Gane’s (2015: 10) comment that Baudrillard’s pataphysics was “simply not radical enough to deal with the ruthless radicalism of neoliberalization” enjoins us to question: is the legacy of the poststructuralist discursive and cultural breaks with Marx’s materialist project not somehow an important part of poststructuralism’s critical lapse on capitalist postmodernity? On this point, Choat (2010: 64) argues for a continuity in that “for both Marx and the poststructuralists, the aim . . . is to develop the possibilities immanent to capitalism.” However, as the case I have presented above attests, the versions of discursive resistance that former Marxist cum poststructuralists such as Lyotard and Baudrillard erect in no way present a real threat to the limitations that liberal capitalism places in the way of such development. If one of Marx’s primary goals is to conceive of the historical possibility of the overcoming of capitalism, and liberalism with it, it is hard to see how discursively driven poststructuralist thought is not embroiled, often despite itself, in the opposing project. That is, and against Choat, it is difficult to square the poststructuralist deferral to the matrices of linguistic discursivism with Marx’s dialectical materialist commitment to revolution. Choat’s own engagement with Marx reinforces my concern with the ways in which poststructuralists approach Marx and his historical materialism primarily as a discursive event “attentive to the irresolvable problems in his work” (159). In this way, Choat comments, “It is this ‘event-Marx’ which post-structuralism tries to liberate” (159). Yet Marx himself points us in another direction: that of engaging in the critical and constructive work of emancipation from the historical morass of capitalist toil and exploitation. Thus not toward Marx the elusive signifier but, rather, Marx’s, and our own, referential horizon of human historical development.

# 2NC

### FW

#### Here is the simultaneous yes and no

Shapiro 14 (Alan N Shapiro, senior lecturer at the Offenbach Art and Design University in Germany, Visiting Professor in Transdisciplinary Design at Folkwang University, visiting professor in the Department of Film and New Media at the NABA (Nuova Accademia di Belle Arti) University of Arts and Design in Milan, May 2014, “Jean Baudrillard and Albert Camus on the Simulacrum of Taking a Stance on War,” *International Journal of Baudrillard Studies* Volume 11 Number 2, modified) gz

*The Rebel* (*L’homme révolté* in French – better translated as *Man in Revolt*) was critical of the prevailing idea on the Left that the end of ‘revolutionary justice’ justifies the means of violence and/or murderous state power. It was about the question of the political and institutional justification of murder in modern society. Against the dominant ideologies of corporate capitalism and self-righteous leftism, Camus the hybrid anarchist-liberal explicates the principles of how to fight and live, and of how to say both no and yes to the existing established order of society, of the authentic rebel. Camus writes:

What is a rebel? ~~A man~~ [One] who says no, but whose refusal does not imply a renunciation. ~~He is~~ [They are] also ~~a man~~ [one] who says yes, from the moment ~~he makes his~~ [they make their] first gesture of rebellion. A slave who has taken orders all ~~his~~ [their] life suddenly decides that ~~he~~ [they] cannot obey some new command. What ~~does he~~ [do they] mean by saying ‘no’? ~~He means~~ [They mean], for example, that ‘this has been going on too long,’ ‘up to this point yes, beyond it no,’ ‘you are going too far,’ or, again, ‘there is a limit beyond which you shall not go’ (Camus 1956: 13).

This is an articulation of Camus’ very important idea of having “a sense of limits.” In his masterful 2004 book on the Sartre-Camus friendship and breakup, Ronald Aronson writes:

Fifty years later it [*The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt*] still remains one of the most original and probing efforts to understand how the great modern impulse to freedom produced totalitarian societies…

[Camus] stressed that morality must remain at the center of politics, and was unremitting in his advocacy of free speech, democratic institutions, and civil rights in any movement for social justice…

Against the tendency of revolutionary philosophy to act as if we can know and settle everything, a philosophy of revolt “would be a philosophy of limits, of calculated ignorance, and of risk.” …

While rejecting what revolutions have become in the 20th century, these ideas certainly remain leftist at their core… Camus’ vision of self-limiting revolt is a prescient articulation of a post-Marxist and postmodern radical politics (Aronson 2004: 123-124, 266).

In the section of *The Rebel* called “Creation and Revolution” (at the end of Part Four, “Rebellion and Art”), Albert Camus sounds a lot like the Jean Baudrillard of *The Mirror of Production* (1975) (Marx’s views on work and play were not radical enough…) when he says: “Capitalist society and revolutionary society are one and the same thing to the extent that they submit themselves to the same means – industrial production… The society based on production is only productive, not creative (Camus 1956:272-273.” And Camus also sounds a lot like the young Karl Marx of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844* when he says: “Work, entirely subordinated to production, has ceased to be creative. Industrial society will open the way to a new civilization only by restoring to the worker the dignity of a creator (Camus: 1956: 273, Marx: 1976).”

Albert Camus and the Algerian War

Jean Baudrillard was born on July 27, 1929 in Reims, in the Champagne-Ardenne region of northeast France, near the Belgian border. Albert Camus was born on November 7, 1913 in Mondovi, Algeria, nowadays called Dréan, a small coastal town in the El Taref province, near the Tunisian border. Although he was highly critical of French colonial rule in Algeria, Camus found that he could not support the side of the revolutionaries during the Algerian War in the 1950s.

As a young man, Camus was sent by the Algiers-based daily newspaper *Alger républicain* to the northern region of Kabylie, which includes all or part of 9 Algerian provinces, to write journalistic accounts of conditions of poverty in the area. The result was a series of articles, “Misère de la Kabylie,” which are reprinted in the 1958 book *Chroniques algériennes*: 1939-1958 (*Actuelles III*), (Camus 2013).

In May 1945, Camus wrote a series of articles for the Parisian daily newspaper *Combat* (an important voice of the French Resistance during the Second World War of which Camus was editor-in-chief) about crisis, famine, justice, political malaise, and the ideas of the political party “Les Amis du Manifeste” in Algeria. These articles were also reprinted in the 1958 Éditions Gallimard book publication *Chroniques algériennes*. They first appeared in May 1945, at the time of the “Sétif massacre” (May 8th), when French military and police are said by historians to have killed as many as tens of thousands of Arabs in retaliation for attacks on French settlers by militant pro-independence demonstrators that killed about 100 French. Camus wrote sympathetically about “Les Amis du Manifeste,” the new political party which wanted citizenship rights for Algerian Arabs.

From July 1955 to February 1956, Camus wrote a series of articles for the Parisian weekly (and, at times, daily) news magazine/newspaper *L’Express*, advocating a “civilian truce” (*trêve pour les civils*) at a time of increased hostilities between Arabs and French in Algeria. These articles are also reprinted in *Chroniques algériennes*. On January 22, 1956, Camus was the main speaker at a meeting of twelve hundred people in Algiers, an audience equally divided beween Algerians and French, putting forward the program of the proposed civilian truce. An angry crowd of right-wing *pied noirs* gathered outside the meeting hall, shouting “Camus to the gallows.” In the “Appeal for a Civilian Truce in Algeria” (the text that accompanied this speech), Camus says:

What do we want? Simply to get the Arab movement and the French authorities, without having to make contact or to commit themselves to anything else, to declare simultaneously that for the duration of the fighting the civilian population will on every occasion be respected and protected… No cause justifies the death of the innocent… However black it may seem, the future of Algeria is not yet altogether sealed. If each individual, Arab or French, made an effort to think over his adversary’s motives, at least the basis of a fruitful discussion would be clear. But if the two Algerian populations, each accusing the other of having begun the quarrel, were to hurl themselves against each other in a sort of xenophobic madness, then any chance for understanding would be drowned in blood (Camus 1960: 134-135).

Faced with potential violence by the angry *pied noir* right-wing militants gathered outside the Cercle du Progrès meeting hall, the listeners to Camus’ speech quickly dispersed. Camus, of course, could subsequently do nothing to stop the escalation and intensification of the Algerian War. According to the Wikipedia article on the Algerian War, estimates of the number of civilians killed during the conflict range from 350,000 to 1.5 million people.4

Albert Memmi, an Arabic-speaking Jewish philosopher born in Tunisia, and the author of the book *The Colonizer and The Colonized*, developed the term “the colonizer of good will” to explain the political position of a thinker like Camus with respect to the major ‘decolonization’ war which occurred in Algeria (Memmi 1991). According to Memmi, “when the Arab Algerians started to demand their political freedom, [Camus] did not see that this was a national demand. He misunderstood the Algerian *national fact* (Rey 2006 : 108 ; citation from Albert Memmi, 1986). The “colonizer of good will,” although leftist and liberal in his politics, cannot truly support the struggle of the colonized because their cause threatens the continued existence of his own community [according to Memmi]. Memmi’s ‘revolutionary’ perspective on Camus’ discourse and actions surrounding Algeria has typified how many ‘leftist’ or ‘postcolonial’ commentators have thought about Camus’ position on the Algerian War (see for example O’Brian, 1970; Said, 1993). But it is not a correct or fruitful interpretation. In the contemporary post-2001 context of the simulacral ‘War on Terror’, and Baudrillard’s brilliant and cogent commentary on it, it is possible to make a new reading of Camus as a thinker of the simulacrum of war.

War is presented to us as a Manichean choice, as the battle of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’. You must choose. Camus refused to choose. He was on the same wavelength as the first principle of a Baudrillardian theory of war.

Four aspects of a Baudrillardian theory of war. The post-structure of the (non-)war machine in the age of media virtuality has properties of binary/digital, simulation/modeling, viral metastasis, and complex intricate paradoxical topology. Camus was certainly on the same wavelength as two of these four ‘Baudrillardian’ principles: the binary/digital logic of the imposed binary choice, the simulacrum of a referendum. And the complex intricate paradoxical topology – Camus was the philosopher *par excellence* of *the absurd*.

Camus in Stockholm

In 1957, Albert Camus was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature. On December 11, 1957, the day after receiving and accepting the prize, Camus met with students at Stockholm University. Among the group was an Algerian student who confronted Camus with a set of tough critical questions about Algeria. After responding that he had always worked for “a just Algeria, where the two peoples should live in peace and equality,” Camus continued with this comment:

I have always condemned terror. I must also condemn a terrorism that is carried out blindly, in the streets of Algiers for example, and may one day strike my mother or my family. I believe in justice, but I will defend my mother before justice (Camus 1965: 1882; I have used the translation found in Aronson 2004: 211).

Camus’ ‘infamous’ comment – made while in Stockholm to receive the Nobel Prize in Literature at the height of the Algerian War – about choosing his mother before justice was an amazingly interesting and adroit intertextual reference to a famous anecdote told by Jean-Paul Sartre in his classic October 29, 1945 lecture “Existentialism is a Humanism”:

I will mention the case of one of my students, who sought me out under the following circumstances: his father had broken off with his mother and, moreover, was inclined to be a ‘collaborator’. His older brother had been killed in the German offensive of 1940, and this young man, with primitive but noble feelings, wanted to avenge him. Her mother, living alone with him and deeply hurt by the partial betrayal of his father and the death of her oldest son, found her only comfort in him. At the time, the young man had the choice of going to England to join the Free French Forces – which would mean abandoning his mother – or remain by her side to help her go on with her life…(Sartre 2007: 30-31).

Sartre told the young man, his student, that he would have to choose, that he was condemned to choose, that he was ‘condemned to be free’, that this was the situation of existence, and that Sartre could not help him to make the choice.

In seeking me out, he knew what my answer would be, and there was only one answer I could give him: “You are free, so choose; in other words, invent. No general code of ethics call tell you what you ought to do; there are no signs in this world (Ibid.: 31).

By saying that he would choose his mother over justice, Camus was saying, in effect, and contra Sartre, that one can choose to not to be forced to choose between apparently mutually exclusive alternatives. Sartrean ethics seems to imply that one must choose either A or B. Camus’ position seems to be closer to that of a ‘deconstructionist psychoanalysis’. “I believe in justice, but I will defend my mother before justice.” Sometimes ‘I’ choose justice. Sometimes ‘I’ choose my mother. ‘I’ creatively navigate back and forth between the two. It depends upon the circumstances of the moment and ‘I’ seek a balance.5 Through the exercise of creativity – the human capacity that will make us most human, according to Camus – one ‘takes matters into one’s own hands’ and reclaims a genuine decision coming from oneself, saying simultaneously ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to both sides of what appears to be the enforced choice imposed on ‘me’ by ‘fate’ itself.

Camus in Uppsala

On December 14, 1957, three days after his encounter with the skeptical Algerian student at Stockholm University, Camus gave a lecture at Uppsala University, Sweden called “Create Dangerously.” In the transcript of this lecture, Camus writes about the virtualization of the economic sphere:

“For about a century we have been living in a society that is not even the society of money (gold can arouse carnal passions) but that of the abstract symbols of money (Camus 1960: 134).”

Compare this with what Jean Baudrillard writes in “Living Coin: Singularity of the Phantasm” in *Impossible Exchange* about money as the media of the universalization of meaninglessness:

“Money then becomes the universal transcription of a world bereft of meaning. This fetish money, around which global speculation revolves – far above and beyond the reproduction of capital – has nothing to do with wealth or the production of wealth. It expresses the breakdown of meaning, the impossibility of exchanging the world for its meaning…(Baudrillard 2001: 127-128).

What Baudrillard writes in these pages about the “the meaninglessness of the world” and the “demand for meaning” [in the “miracle of money”] echoes the most brilliant passages of *The Myth of Sisyphus* and provides a crucial bridge between the philosophy of absurdism and the literary sociology of the simulacra of modern culture.

Then Camus writes in “Create Dangerously” about semiotics and society:

“The society of merchants can be defined as a society in which things disappear in favor of signs. When a ruling class measures its fortunes, not by the acre of land or the ingot of gold, but by the number of figures corresponding ideally to a certain number of exchange operations, it thereby condemns itself to setting a certain kind of humbug at the center of its experience and its universe (Camus 1960: 253-254).”

Then come comments by Camus anticipating Reality TV and *The Truman Show*:

“What is there more real, for instance, in our universe than a man’s life, and how can we hope to preserve it better than in a realistic film? But under what conditions is such a film possible? Under purely imaginary conditions. We should have to presuppose, in fact, an ideal camera focused on the man day and night and constantly registering his every move. The very projection of such a film would last a lifetime and could be seen only by an audience of people willing to waste their lives in watching someone else’s life in great detail (Camus 1960: 258-259).”

Compare Jean Baudrillard writing in *Simulacra and Simulations* about the 1973 Public Broadcasting Station (PBS) Reality TV show “An American Family,” featuring the Loud family and the separation and subsequent divorce of Bill and Pat Loud:

“This family came apart during the shooting: a crisis flaired up, the Louds went their separate ways, etc. Whence that insoluble controversy: was TV responsible? What would have happened if TV hadn't been there… The producer's trump card was to say: ‘They lived as if we weren’t there.’ An absurd, paradoxical formula – neither true nor false: but utopian. The ‘as if we weren’t there’ is equivalent to ‘as if you were there’ (Baudrillard 1983: 49-50).”

During his lifetime, two of Jean Baudrillard’s deepest commitments were to seduction and to aesthetics. The ‘hyperreality’ of modern culture seeks to efface the difference between ‘reality’ and its representation. Simulation endeavors to eradicate the aesthetic dimension. Seduction is that which encompasses, precedes, and exceeds simulation. Seduction is the difference between ‘reality’ and its representation, or between the ‘original’ and the ‘copy’ – that difference which simulation seeks to suppress in its attempt to represent or institute ‘reality’. Albert Camus was also very concerned with seduction, for example in the section in *The Myth of Sisyphus* on the literary figure of Don Juan. In “Create Dangerously,” Camus reflects deeply on the work of the artist, on rebellion and ambiguity in art, and on creativity. The primary responsibility of the artist is not to take political stances: it is to create.

#### 7 – Debate does not change the fundamental values of its participants, but it does trend them away from over-reliance on their initial, unvetted gut reactions to symbolic politics in favor of more complex, deep understandings of issues – that takes out their link turn and magnifies the link

Niemeyer 11 [Simon Niemeyer, Centre for Deliberative Global Governance, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University. The Emancipatory Effect of Deliberation: Empirical Lessons from Mini-Publics. 2011. https://unige.ch/sciences-societe/socio/files/2114/0533/6108/002.pdf]

The results of the two case studies in this article suggest that deliberation does not fundamentally change individuals or inculcate a sense of moral duty. The particular values that prevailed in both issues were always present (and measurable), even if they were latent in expressed preferences. Before deliberation, most participants believed they were acting in the public interest,69 but good intentions alone are not sufficient to formulate civic-minded preferences. Predeliberative preferences were more strongly influenced by discourses associated with symbolic politics. Following deliberation, symbolic cues reduced the “cost” of arriving at a decision,70 but the cognitive shortcut resulted in positions that did not properly reflect participants’ overall subjectivity.

Before deliberation, symbolic politics—or at least the mere presence of potent symbols—distorted participants’ preferences. This process may be manipulative and overt, as in the case of the Bloomfield Track, or incidental, as in the case of the Fremantle Bridge. Deliberation successfully corrected the influence of symbolic politics because it provided both the incentive and the means to develop positions on an intersubjective set of recognized issues that extended beyond the narrow set of unhelpful symbolic ones. The mechanism whereby this occurred did not so much involve changing incentive structures, as predicted by institutional rational choice.71 Rather, it changed the decision pathway from a casual understanding of emotionally appealing content to a deeper understanding that allowed participants to better express their own subjectivity. The change was as much a function of stripping away the impact of symbolic arguments as it was due to participants’ increased ability and willingness to deal with issue complexity. This suggests that the transformative effect might be more easily replicated in the wider public sphere than is ordinarily

# 1NR

### Case

#### Warming leads to extinction

Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al. (Peter, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” *Futures*, 102)

#### In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.’

#### Only growth solves warming fast enough – markets force sustainability.

Fedrizzi 15 [Rick Fedrizzi, CEO, US Green Building Council, 11-30-2015, "Capitalism is the solution to climate change," CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/30/capitalism-is-the-solution-to-climate-change-commentary.html]

Environmentalists around the world are pinning their hopes on the international climate talks happening now. But conference rooms in Paris are not where the action on climate change really is. Rather, it's in boardrooms around the world. Companies large and small are taking steps to protect the environment, while increasing their profits. They're motivated not by consensus or conservation, but by cold hard cash. It's true that industry has contributed enormously to climate change and environmental degradation. Business interests have long opposed sustainable practices they believed would negatively impact profits. And the environmental community has held fast to this dynamic, holding up industry and capitalism as the enemy for decades. But the truth is that capitalism is the only force strong enough and capable of acting quickly enough to address climate change before the damage becomes irreversible. I've seen the kind of positive effect business can have on our environment when driven by profit and economic growth — and in one of the world's largest, dirtiest industries no less: real estate. In 1993, I co-founded the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC), a non-profit organization dedicated to sustainability in our built environment. USGBC created a voluntary rating system — Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design, or LEED — which allows buildings to earn credits for their sustainable features, including energy and water efficiency, indoor environmental quality, and recycled materials. LEED has had a dramatic impact on profits and the planet. In just 15 short years, 14 billion square feet of real estate have been LEED registered and certified in more than 150 countries, including some of the most iconic buildings in the world, from the Chrysler Building in Manhattan, which reduced energy use by 21 percent, to Lincoln Financial Field, home of the Philadelphia Eagles, which has reduced its energy consumption by the equivalent of removing 41,000 cars per year from the road. Thanks to LEED, as legendary environmentalist Paul Hawken put it, "USGBC may have had a greater impact than any other single organization in the world on materials saved, toxins eliminated, greenhouse gases avoided, and human health enhanced." But the benefits are more than just environmental — they're economic. From hospitals to schools to skyscrapers to factories, communities and companies that have invested in LEED see energy savings, cost savings, and a significant return on their investment. And green buildings haven't only been profitable for building owners, but also for the American economy at large. Green construction added $167.4 billion to the U.S. GDP from 2011 to 2014, according to a new 2015 Green Building Economic Impact Study. This year, the green building sector will employ more than 2.3 million Americans, and by 2018, it is expected to nearly double in size. Of course, real estate isn't the only industry where economic and environmental benefits align. Today, the power of sustainability to drive profits is being quietly embraced throughout the global economy, and major companies are reaping the benefits. Take United Technologies, the manufacturing powerhouse that ranks 45th on the Fortune 500 list. Between 2006 and 2014, UTC reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent, and water use by 33 percent. Over those same eight years, its stock price more than doubled. Unilever, one of the world's largest consumer-goods companies, has reduced emissions by 37 percent since 2008, and its efforts have saved the company more than 400 million euros (US$422 million). GE's Ecomagination program has boosted its top line by $200 billion over the past decade, growing at four times the rate of the company at large. Last year, Siemens' Environmental Portfolio not only eliminated 428 million tons of CO2 emissions for its customers, but also brought in €33 billion. The list goes on and on. As Patagonia's CEO Yvon Chouinard says: "Every time we've made a decision that's right for the planet, it's made us more money." The private sector has long been seen as the enemy of environmentalism, and for good reason. But times have changed. Today, a select number of enlightened corporations are wasting less, earning more, and proving just how profitable sustainability can be. There's no reason to keep waiting for an elusive climate agreement. Instead, let's take action to advance market-driven solutions that have the potential — and the ability — to save the planet. It's time for environmentalists and business leaders to leverage the profit motive to achieve our common goal: a sustainable, profitable future.

#### Only growth solves warming fast enough – markets force sustainability.

Fedrizzi 15 [Rick Fedrizzi, CEO, US Green Building Council, 11-30-2015, "Capitalism is the solution to climate change," CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/30/capitalism-is-the-solution-to-climate-change-commentary.html]

Environmentalists around the world are pinning their hopes on the international climate talks happening now. But conference rooms in Paris are not where the action on climate change really is. Rather, it's in boardrooms around the world. Companies large and small are taking steps to protect the environment, while increasing their profits. They're motivated not by consensus or conservation, but by cold hard cash. It's true that industry has contributed enormously to climate change and environmental degradation. Business interests have long opposed sustainable practices they believed would negatively impact profits. And the environmental community has held fast to this dynamic, holding up industry and capitalism as the enemy for decades. But the truth is that capitalism is the only force strong enough and capable of acting quickly enough to address climate change before the damage becomes irreversible. I've seen the kind of positive effect business can have on our environment when driven by profit and economic growth — and in one of the world's largest, dirtiest industries no less: real estate. In 1993, I co-founded the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC), a non-profit organization dedicated to sustainability in our built environment. USGBC created a voluntary rating system — Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design, or LEED — which allows buildings to earn credits for their sustainable features, including energy and water efficiency, indoor environmental quality, and recycled materials. LEED has had a dramatic impact on profits and the planet. In just 15 short years, 14 billion square feet of real estate have been LEED registered and certified in more than 150 countries, including some of the most iconic buildings in the world, from the Chrysler Building in Manhattan, which reduced energy use by 21 percent, to Lincoln Financial Field, home of the Philadelphia Eagles, which has reduced its energy consumption by the equivalent of removing 41,000 cars per year from the road. Thanks to LEED, as legendary environmentalist Paul Hawken put it, "USGBC may have had a greater impact than any other single organization in the world on materials saved, toxins eliminated, greenhouse gases avoided, and human health enhanced." But the benefits are more than just environmental — they're economic. From hospitals to schools to skyscrapers to factories, communities and companies that have invested in LEED see energy savings, cost savings, and a significant return on their investment. And green buildings haven't only been profitable for building owners, but also for the American economy at large. Green construction added $167.4 billion to the U.S. GDP from 2011 to 2014, according to a new 2015 Green Building Economic Impact Study. This year, the green building sector will employ more than 2.3 million Americans, and by 2018, it is expected to nearly double in size. Of course, real estate isn't the only industry where economic and environmental benefits align. Today, the power of sustainability to drive profits is being quietly embraced throughout the global economy, and major companies are reaping the benefits. Take United Technologies, the manufacturing powerhouse that ranks 45th on the Fortune 500 list. Between 2006 and 2014, UTC reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent, and water use by 33 percent. Over those same eight years, its stock price more than doubled. Unilever, one of the world's largest consumer-goods companies, has reduced emissions by 37 percent since 2008, and its efforts have saved the company more than 400 million euros (US$422 million). GE's Ecomagination program has boosted its top line by $200 billion over the past decade, growing at four times the rate of the company at large. Last year, Siemens' Environmental Portfolio not only eliminated 428 million tons of CO2 emissions for its customers, but also brought in €33 billion. The list goes on and on. As Patagonia's CEO Yvon Chouinard says: "Every time we've made a decision that's right for the planet, it's made us more money." The private sector has long been seen as the enemy of environmentalism, and for good reason. But times have changed. Today, a select number of enlightened corporations are wasting less, earning more, and proving just how profitable sustainability can be. There's no reason to keep waiting for an elusive climate agreement. Instead, let's take action to advance market-driven solutions that have the potential — and the ability — to save the planet. It's time for environmentalists and business leaders to leverage the profit motive to achieve our common goal: a sustainable, profitable future.

#### Moral uncertainty proves extinction outweighs – if you aren’t 100% sure their arg is true, keep future generations alive to figure things out

Bostrom 12 [Nick Bostrom, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority. 2012. www.existential-risk.org/concept.html]

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.

Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.